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The Evolution Toward Judicial 
Independence in the Continuing 
Quest for LGBT Equality 
Susan J. Becker† 
Abstract 
Judicial decisions that hold same-sex marriage bans 
unconstitutional, no matter how that conclusion is reached, overturn 
laws or constitutional provisions that were passed with the support of 
a democratic majority. This Article takes an in-depth look at judicial 
activism and judicial independence to determine whether such 
victories for same-sex litigants were done properly by the judiciary. In 
the eyes of the Framers, an independent judiciary was to be a crucial 
check on the other branches’ constitutional limitations. With this in 
mind, judicial independence—where, in contrast with activism, judges 
meticulously apply the well-examined facts to controlling precedent 
without accounting for majority views—is a key to maintaining our 
democratic system. 
This Article examines many of the cases that resulted in victories 
for LGBT litigants. First, cases ruling state same-sex marriage bans 
unconstitutional, for example, Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin and Iowa’s 
Varnum v. O’Brien, are analyzed. Also, the cases declaring the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional, including Gill v. Office of 
Personnel Management, Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, and the district court, circuit court, and 
Supreme Court decisions in Windsor, are discussed. Although these 
cases tend to overturn laws supported by democratic majorities, the 
courts pay great attention to the details of the cases and steadfastly 
analyze and apply precedent. 
After looking in detail at cases establishing same-sex marriage 
rights, one must conclude that the courts engaged in strong judicial 
independence. Such independent judicial decision making contains 
sound legal analysis and is constitutionally necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State 
University. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence  
864 
Contents 
Introduction .................................................................................................. 864 
I. Judicial Independence Overview .......................................................... 866 
A. The Theoretical Ideal ........................................................................... 866 
B. Theory Meets Reality ........................................................................... 871 
1. The Formalism-Realism Divide ....................................................... 871 
2. Empirical Data on Judicial Decision Making .................................. 874 
a.  General Empirical Analyses .................................................... 876 
b.  Empirical Analyses of Decisions Involving LGBT Litigants .... 881 
3. Additional Theories of Judicial Decision Making ............................ 882 
4. In Their Own Words: How Judges Decide Cases ............................ 884 
a.  Acknowledging the Obvious ...................................................... 884 
b.  Commitment to Neutrality: Personal and Institutional 
Restraints ............................................................................... 885 
c. Activism .................................................................................... 888 
1. In Search of a Definition ................................................................. 890 
2. Flaws Inherent in Contemporary “Activism” Label ........................ 891 
a.  Judges Must Judge ................................................................... 891 
b.  Judges Must Constrain Legislators .......................................... 893 
c.  Judges Must Facilitate the Law’s Evolution ............................ 895 
II. Judicial Independence and LGBT Litigants .................................... 895 
A. Possible Degrees of Judicial Independence ........................................... 895 
B. Demonstrative Failures of Judicial Independence ................................ 897 
III. Judicial Independence Shift in LGBT Marriage Cases .............. 905 
A. The Long Shadow of Baker v. Nelson .................................................. 906 
B. Pro-Equality State Decisions Prior to Windsor and Perry .................. 909 
1. Hawaii’s Saga: Baehr v. Lewin ........................................................ 909 
2. Massachusetts, California, and Iowa Equality Decisions ................. 914 
3. Lower Federal Court DOMA Decisions Prior to Windsor ............... 921 
C. Windsor ................................................................................................ 931 
1. District Court .................................................................................. 931 
2. Second Circuit ................................................................................. 932 
3. Supreme Court ................................................................................ 937 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 946 
Introduction 
Many years have passed since Professor Rhonda Rivera published 
her groundbreaking research on the disadvantaged legal status of gay 
and lesbian citizens in this country. Titled Our Straight-Laced Judges: 
The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States,1 
 
1. Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of 
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 Hastings L.J. 799 (1979) 
[hereinafter Rivera I]. This article is reprinted in full at 50 Hastings 
L.J. 1015 (1999); see also Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced 
Judges: Twenty Years Later, 50 Hastings L.J. 1179 (1999) [hereinafter 
Rivera II] (explaining the lack of legal literature in the 1970s on how the 
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Rivera’s 157-page tome documented the dearth of legal protections 
and abundance of judicial prejudice evident in cases where the sexual 
orientation of one or more litigants was at issue.2 Her exhaustive 
analysis of judicial decisions resolving controversies in private and 
public employment, military service, professional licensing, public 
school teaching, family law, First Amendment free speech and 
association, immigration and naturalization, criminal law, and other 
issues amply supported the conclusion Rivera foreshadowed in the 
title of her article. “[J]udges in particular, as well as attorneys, need 
to examine their homophobic attitudes and the many popularly held 
myths and stereotypes,”3 Rivera wrote. “Only after such a 
reevaluation of judicial and societal attitudes can our legal system 
begin to achieve a fair and equal application of the laws to  
all persons.”4 
The majority of relatively recent court decisions—including the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s groundbreaking decisions in Romer v. Evans,5 
Lawrence v. Texas,6 and United States v. Windsor7—suggest that 
many judges have begun engaging in the reflection Rivera had hoped 
for, embracing a more neutral stance on homosexuality and devoting 
more attention to the facts and law of the cases before them that 
involve lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) litigants.8   
law affected LGBT people and the efforts that went into producing the 
first major article on the subject and outlining the advances and 
setbacks LGBT litigants had experienced in the intervening twenty 
years). 
2. Rivera I, supra note 1; see also Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian 
and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1551 (1993) 
(providing a legal history of litigation involving LGBT litigants with 
primary focus on cases decided prior to 1986); Mary C. Dunlap, The 
Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the Male/Female 
Dichotomy, 30 Hastings L.J. 1131, 1139–47 (1979) (documenting legal 
struggles faced by transgender and intersex individuals).  
3. Rivera I, supra note 1, at 1168. 
4. Id. 
5. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
7. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
8. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity: 
Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (2010) (providing 
analyses of recent landmark decisions affecting LGBT rights and 
suggesting that state and federal court judges are moving toward a 
humanity-centered vision that recognizes LGBT people as worthy of 
constitutional rights and protections); Susan J. Becker, Many Are 
Chilled, but Few Are Frozen: How Transformative Learning in Popular 
Culture, Christianity, and Science Will Lead to the Eventual Demise of 
Legally Sanctioned Discrimination Against Sexual Minorities in the 
United States, 14 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 177 (2006) 
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This Article posits that court decisions extending equal rights to 
LGBT litigants are not, as some critics claim, the result of improperly 
motivated “judicial activism” or “culture wars” being waged 
inappropriately in courts of law. To the contrary, pro-equality 
decisions reflect the trend toward eradication of improper judicial bias 
that historically animated judicial decisions in cases involving LGBT 
litigants. In contrast to Justice Antonin Scalia’s view that judicial 
decisions in which LGBT litigants prevail capitulate to the 
“homosexual agenda,”9 this article explains that decisions advancing 
LGBT equality are based on an appropriately restrained application 
of law to facts, thus moving the judiciary closer to the elusive ideal of 
judicial independence.  
Arguments supporting this thesis are presented as follows. Part I 
of this Article contrasts the abstract principle of judicial independence 
as a cornerstone of U.S. democracy with the practical realities of 
judicial decision making. Part II highlights the historical lack of 
independence exercised by judges that resulted in unjust decisions and 
perpetuated negative stereotypes of LGBT persons. Part III explores 
the more recent trend of judges moving away from anti-LGBT animus 
towards neutrality and independence in cases involving LGBT 
litigants. Part III also examines the reasons for the lessening of anti-
LGBT judicial bias, focusing specifically on the compelling facts and 
evidence presented in state and federal marriage equality cases, 
including the Supreme Court’s Windsor decision.  
 I. Judicial Independence Overview  
Only an independent judiciary can ensure that the minority is 
protected from the tyranny of the majority. Only an independent 
judiciary committed to the rule of law can safeguard every 
citizen’s liberties and rights.10  
A. The Theoretical Ideal  
Judicial independence demands that judges resolve cases with 
fidelity to the “rule of law” established in case precedents, statutes, 
and procedural rules.11 Decisions rendered in adherence to this 
 
(tracking changes in societal and judicial attitudes toward LGBT people 
over the past several decades and predicting that full equality will 
eventually be gained in this country).  
9. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
10. Marsha K. Ternus, Judicial Independence in Peril?, 60 Clev. St. L. 
Rev. 479, 487 (2012).  
11. See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United 
States, 40 St. Louis U. L.J. 989, 989 (1996) (emphasizing that judicial 
independence requires judges to “decide according to law, rather than 
according to their own whims or to the will of the political branches of 
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principle are immunized from improper influences such as personal 
interests, religious beliefs, concern for popular opinion, and the desire 
to please special interest groups.12 As one judicial observer explains, 
“[i]ndependent and impartial adjudication denies the notion that the 
judge will bring to bear a view which represents that of a particular 
section of the community.”13 
The principal architects of the U.S. Constitution identified an 
independent judiciary as essential to the survival of the nascent 
republic.14 James Madison observed that “[t]he accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”15 
Alexander Hamilton urged that constitutional limitations imposed on 
Congress—“for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no 
ex post facto laws, and the like”16—could only be achieved through 
“complete independence of the courts of justice.”17 Hamilton also 
defended the Constitution’s lifetime appointment of federal judges as 
“the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to 
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”18  
In language relevant to the contemporary struggle for LGBT 
equality, Hamilton recognized the crucial role of judicial independence 
in protecting the rights of minorities: 
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the 
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of 
those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the 
 
government”); Ternus, supra note 10, at 480 (defining the rule of law as 
“a process of governing by laws that are applied fairly and uniformly to 
all persons”).  
12. Ternus, supra note 10, at 480 (stating that judicial independence 
demands a “judiciary that is committed to the rule of law, independent 
of—free of—outside influence, including personal bias or preference”). 
13. Anthony Mason, The Appointment and Removal of Judges, in Fragile 
Bastion: Judicial Independence in The Nineties and Beyond 1, 4 
(Helen Cunningham ed., 1997). 
14. Judicial autonomy was not a novel idea. Rather, “the political theory of 
an independent judiciary is the culmination of the work of eight political 
theorists writing over the span of 22 centuries, with each building on the 
contributions of the others.” Scott Douglas Gerber, A Distinct 
Judicial Power: The Origins of an Independent Judiciary, 1607–
1787, at 325 (2011). 
15. The Federalist No. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Edward Meade 
Earle ed., 1937). 
16. The Federalist No. 78, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Meade 
Earle ed., 1937). 
17. Id.  
18. Id. at 503.  
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influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate 
among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily 
give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, 
have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous 
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the 
minor party in the community.19 
Hamilton further cautioned that judges need “an uncommon portion 
of fortitude” to faithfully guard the Constitution “where legislative 
invasions of it ha[ve] been instigated by the major voice of the 
community.”20 Hamilton’s perspective became a cornerstone of 
constitutional jurisprudence.21  
Several centuries after Hamilton’s plea, Ninth Circuit Judge J. 
Clifford Wallace observed that “although the Constitution imposes no 
absolute limits on popular decision making, constitutional protections 
and structures do represent significant practical restraints on the 
scope of majoritarian democracy.”22 Constitutional structure, Judge 
Wallace explained, reflects the Framers’ intent for “the judicial 
branch to have a special role in the protection of [individual] rights.”23 
The majority of colonies and the first states adopted similar 
governmental structures based on this rationale.24  
Efforts to safeguard judicial independence are deeply embedded in 
state and federal constitutions and statutes and the regulatory 
schemes that govern judges, lawyers, and others who interact with the 
judiciary. The effectiveness of these measures to ensure judicial 
independence remains subject to debate.  
 
19. Id. at 508. 
20. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 16, at 509 (Alexander Hamilton). 
21. Hamilton’s prediction that lifetime tenure of federal judges was essential 
to judicial independence has been vindicated by the fact that “no federal 
judge has ever been removed by impeachment for rendering an 
unpopular decision, although the media and politicians regularly level all 
kinds of scornful epithets at judges.” Patricia M. Wald, Reflections on 
Judging: At Home and Abroad, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 219, 231 (2004). 
22. J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return 
to the Moorings, in Judges on Judging: Views from the Bench 205, 
206 (David M. O’Brien, ed., 4th ed. 2013). 
23. Id. 
24. See generally GERBER, supra note 14 (explaining the concept of 
separation of powers from Aristotle through the drafting of the U.S. 
Constitution with focus on the origins of an independent judiciary in the 
original thirteen states and their colonial predecessors). Others have 
observed that although judicial independence is commonly evaluated 
through the lens of constitutional law decisions, it is also of great value 
in disputes that demand neutral evaluation and application of various 
legal authorities other than constitutional law and doctrine. Id. at 334 
n.35. 
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For example, the President’s power to appoint federal judges is 
severely constrained by the requirement that nominees are elevated to 
the federal bench only upon the “[a]dvice and [c]onsent of the 
Senate.”25 This significantly limits the President’s power to appoint 
justices based solely on the President’s personal-political litmus test.26 
State judges face retention or contested elections, thus making them 
accountable to the people for decisions that appear to unfairly favor 
particular positions or parties.27  
Judicial ethics codes further circumscribe the conduct of judicial 
candidates and judges.28 For example, the premier rule in the 
 
25. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; see also Kevin L. Lyles, The Gatekeepers: 
Federal District Courts in the Political Process 187 (1997) 
(“Senate majority leader Trent Lott warned Clinton that the GOP 
majority would ‘resist with every fiber of [its] being’ if Clinton ‘name[d] 
the kind of federal judges who would overturn this week’s election 
results with next year’s court decisions.’”); Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. 
Segal, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial 
Appointments 85–116 (2005) (describing the process for nominating 
Supreme Court justices, including the role of politics and ideology in 
that process); Nancy Scherer, Scoring Points: Politicians, 
Activists, and the Lower Federal Court Appointment Process 
(2005) (describing how congressional representatives support judicial 
candidates who support their policies). 
26. Of course this safeguard is severely tested if not eliminated when: (1) 
the President and a majority of Senators share the same political 
ideology; and (2) the President and a sufficient number of Senators have 
severely conflicting ideologies that prevent the President’s nominees 
from being confirmed. The latter situation has been a defining 
characteristic of President Obama’s time in office. See generally Sheldon 
Goldman, Elliot Slotnick & Sara Schiavoni, Obama’s Judiciary at 
Midterm: The Confirmation Drama Continues, 94 Judicature 262 
(2011) (containing extensive analysis of presidential judicial 
appointments in historical context).  
27. Controversy continues as to whether merit selection of judges followed 
by a retention election or contested judicial elections provide the 
superior method of achieving a well-qualified, independent judiciary. See 
Symposium, Judicial Elections, 64 Ark. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (providing a 
number of informative articles on issues relating to judicial elections in 
the states); Thomas R. Phillips, The Merits of Merit Selection, 32 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 67 (2009) (advocating for merit selection 
systems); Wald, supra note 21, at 223–24 (observing that 
“[i]ndependence-oriented critics deplore the pressures imposed by direct 
election of the high court judges in a majority of states, and democracy-
oriented critics are constantly reminding us of the unaccountability of 
life-tenured federal judges who they say are too often free to follow their 
own preferences rather than ‘the law’ or the public’s will”).  
28. Each state has its own system of regulating its judicial officers and 
employees, and many have adopted the ABA Model Rules of Judicial 
Conduct or modified versions thereof. Federal judges must follow the 
regulations articulated in the Guide to Judiciary Policy, including the 
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which was substantially 
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American Bar Association’s (ABA) Code of Judicial Conduct 
mandates that judges “shall uphold and promote the independence, 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,” avoiding not only 
impropriety but “the appearance of impropriety.”29 Judges must also 
avoid making decisions based on personal bias or prejudice30 and 
“shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.”31 In short, 
the ethics rules are part of a larger regulatory scheme that reflects “a 
central core of agreed standards” that define judges “as the neutral, 
impartial, calm, noncontentious umpire standing between the 
adversary parties.”32  
Respect for the theory of judicial independence is not, of course, a 
uniquely American phenomenon. The advantage—indeed the 
necessity—of judges unconstrained by personal bias, political pressure, 
and other coercive forces has long been recognized elsewhere. This is 
especially clear in international human rights.33 The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, declares that 
“[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals,” and that 
once charged with a crime, “everyone shall be entitled to a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.”34 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
similarly champions the idea that “[e]veryone is entitled in full  
revised in 2009 and partially revised in 2014. Guide to Judiciary 
Policy: Code of Conduct for United States Judges (2014), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/condu
ct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf. 
29. Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1 (2011). It is notable that 
the Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges 
(2009) contain similar language. 
30. Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.3 (2011); Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges Canon 3 (2009).  
31. Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.4 (2011); see also Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges Canon 3(A)(1)(2009) 
(containing similar language). 
32. Marvin E. Frankel, The Adversary Judge: The Experience of the Trial 
Judge, in Judges on Judging, supra note 22, at 79, 80. 
33. See generally Harold Baer, Jr., Judges Under Fire: Human 
Rights, Independent Judges, and the Rule of Law (2011) 
(providing inspiring stories of judges who have refused to succumb to 
political pressure and other outside influences, often at great personal 
cost); Linda Camp Keith, Judicial Independence and Human Rights 
Protection Around the World, 85 Judicature 195 (2002).  
34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, § 1, Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, 176. This document is now joined by over 
160 nations. U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaties in Force 409 (2013) 
(listing nations that are parties to the treaty); see also Wald, supra note 
21, at 227–29 (emphasizing the importance of independent judges on 
international courts). 
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equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any 
criminal charge against him.”35 
B. Theory Meets Reality 
1. The Formalism-Realism Divide 
Legal commentators have produced thousands of books and 
articles attempting to explain how judges decide cases.36  
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, judicial decisions were 
rarely seen as illegitimate exercises of power. Based on the oracular 
theory of judicial decision making, judges simply divined established 
truths from a sufficient body of predominately common law. Viewed 
through this somewhat esoteric lens, the “law was conceived as a 
mystical body of permanent truths, and the judge was seen as one 
who declared what these truths were and made them intelligible—as 
an ‘oracle’ who found and interpreted the law.”37 The oracle theory 
presupposed that court decisions were unaffected by the personal 
values or judgments of the jurists rendering them.38  
The concept that came to be known as “formalism” similarly 
characterized the judicial decision-making process as so sterile and 
cerebral that the possibility of personal bias was inconceivable. Often 
associated with the judges who populated the U.S. legal system 
between the 1870s and the 1930s, formalism characterizes 
adjudication as a mechanical application of facts to law, yielding 
consistent and just results.39 Formalism reflects the philosophy of 
 
35. UNITED NATIONS, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10 
(1948). 
36. See generally The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior (Nancy Maveety 
ed., 2003) (discussing the diverse approaches taken by political scientists 
beginning in the late nineteenth century in trying to devise and apply 
scientific paradigms for analyzing how judges decide cases); Charles 
Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 
Cornell L. Rev. 191 (2012) (providing overview of theories of judicial 
decision making and empirical studies of that process). 
37. G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles 
of Leading American Judges 10 (3d ed. 2007). 
38. Frank M. Coffin, The Ways of a Judge: Reflections from the 
Federal Appellate Bench 206 (1980). 
39. Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 62 (1977). Formalists 
perceived law as “a closed, logical system” in which “[t]he judicial 
function has nothing to do with the adaptation of rules of law to 
changing conditions; it is restricted to the discovery of what the true 
rules of law are and indeed always have been.” Id. Moreover, “the truth, 
once arrived at, is immutable and eternal.” Id.; see also Jerome 
Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930) (describing formalist 
American thought). Formalist thought took root during the Civil War 
era and continued into the 1920s. See generally Gilmore, supra note 39, 
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Christopher Columbus Langdell, the influential dean of Harvard Law 
School who perceived law as a hard science akin to biology  
or chemistry.40  
In the scientific realm, problems yield one correct answer. Applied 
in the legal realm, judges honored the doctrine of stare decisis41 by 
carefully reviewing case precedents to find that single, correct answer. 
This practice, in turn, left “no need or room for a judge’s values or 
sense of the evolution of society.”42 Formalism’s roots, however, can 
be traced back to the birth of the United States as an independent 
nation, as colonists’ intense distaste for the vast discretion exercised 
by royal judges fanned the flames of dissent.43 During “the Revolution 
in 1776 Americans sought to severely limit this judicial discretion,” 
one historian argues.44 “The aim, as [Thomas] Jefferson put it, was to 
end ‘the eccentric impulses of whimsical, capricious designing man’ 
and to make the judge ‘a mere machine.’”45 More recently, formalism 
has been described as “the existence of an impermeable barrier 
between the domain of legal argument, on the one hand, and that of 
political or philosophical argument, on the other.”46 
In contrast to the oracle or formalism views, Judge Jerome Frank 
and others led the legal realism movement commonly associated with 
the 1930s to present.47 Legal realists reject the conceptualization of 
 
at 12; Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 Yale 
L.J. 493, 495 (1996) (noting that the formalistic perspective was greatly 
influenced by Christopher Columbus Langdell’s advocacy of law as a 
discrete “intellectual discipline independent of theology, moral 
philosophy, economics, or political science, one that involved the 
application of scientific methods to common law materials”). 
40. Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of 
Ideas and Men, 1817–1967, at 175–76 (1967); Thomas C. Grey, 
Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1983).  
41. “[S]tare decisis refers to the practice of a court deferring to some set of 
precedent for an institutional reason (in contrast to considering an issue 
afresh).” Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the 
United States, 12 Nev. L.J. 787, 789–90 (2012). 
42. Coffin, supra note 38, at 207. 
43. Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of 
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 49, 50 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997). 
44.  Id. 
45. Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson, To Edmund Pendleton in 1 The Papers 
of Thomas Jefferson 503, 505 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
46. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the 
Legal Profession 252 (1993). 
47. See Roy Kreitner, Biographing Realist Jurisprudence, 35 Law & Soc. 
Inquiry 765, 770–71 (2010). The growth of realism’s popularity did not 
result in complete abandonment of formalism’s appeal. See, e.g., Herbert 
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judges as processors applying law to fact in a mechanized manner. 
Judge Frank, for example, observed that judicial decision making 
departed from the scientific process employed for geometry in at least 
two key ways. “First . . . the decisions of a judge inevitably draw 
upon his experience in a way that the judgments of a geometer do 
not,” notes one scholar.48 “And second, they are always the result of a 
series of discretionary choices that have no counterpart in the science 
of geometry.”49 As a result, Frank believed that “experience and 
choice are not merely compatible with the activity of judging; they 
are among its essential conditions.”50 
Some realists conceptualize judicial decision making as judges 
reaching conclusions first, and then embarking on quests to identify 
facts and law supporting their desired outcomes, thereby undermining 
both predictability and credibility.51 Adherents of this genre of realism 
“debunked rules, principles, and the aspiration for certainty as mere 
myths cloaking the willfulness inherent in judicial decisions.”52  
This does not mean, however, that all judges, scholars, and others 
gathered under the “realist” umbrella viewed judicial decision making 
as a fraudulent process. As one scholar explained, many “realists 
pointed to the role of idiosyncrasy in law, but they believed in a rule 
of law—hence they attempted to make it more efficient and more 
certain.”53 Far from being diehard cynics, realists hoped their 
observations about the judicial process would serve “to increase the 
certainty and predictability of law, to better train lawyers, to advance 
legal justice, and to reform the law to better serve social needs.”54 A  
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1, 15 (1959) (arguing that courts should apply constitutional 
principles from an abstract perspective rather than the more personal 
effect of those principles on the litigants, urging that “the main 
constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely 
principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching 
judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate 
result that is achieved”). 
48. Kronman, supra note 46, at 189.  
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. See Frank, supra note 39, at 100; Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic 
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 444 (1930). 
52. Coffin, supra note 38, at 209; see also White, supra note 37, at 204 
(describing twentieth-century judges’ fall in status from oracle to “a 
social engineer, or a ‘hunch player’ who understood and trusted his 
instincts, or a craftsman in the ‘reasoned elaboration’ of justifications for 
his power”). 
53. Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960, at 231 (1986). 
54. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The 
Role of Politics in Judging 94 (2010). 
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perspective described as “prudential realism” embraced the view that 
“practical wisdom is needed in the study and administration of law.”55 
2. Empirical Data on Judicial Decision Making 
Many modern theorists rely on empirical studies to cast judicial 
decision making in more black-and-white terms: judges render 
decisions based on their political ideologies and to advance their 
personal and professional agendas and careers. These outcome-
oriented models of judicial decision making are based primarily on 
studies of federal appellate judges and Supreme Court justices. Extant 
data lends significant support for both the attitudinal model, in which 
judges decide cases based on political ideology,56 and strategic models 
of judicial decision making.57  
Like all empirical studies designed to link cause and effect, 
empirical studies that identify factors influencing judicial decision 
making are subject to criticism due to potential methodological flaws 
and other shortcomings.58 In addition, empiricists readily admit that  
55. Kronman, supra note 46, at 168, 196 (crediting Columbia Law 
Professor Karl Llewellyn with identifying prudential pragmatism, but 
Llewellyn did not describe the judicial decision-making process in those 
specific words). Id. at 225 (stating that Llewellyn “championed” and 
“provided the richest account” of prudential realism).  
56. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and 
the Attitudinal Model Revisited 86 (2002). 
57. Strategic decision making can be defined in different ways. For example, 
it includes cases in which appellate judges concur in a majority opinion 
that at least guarantees their second-favored outcomes, thereby avoiding 
their lesser (and perhaps least) favored resolution of the case. For a 
discussion of how this type of strategic decision making can play out, see 
Nancy Scherer, Viewing the Supreme Court’s Marriage Cases Through 
the Lens of Political Science, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1131 (2014). It 
can also mean that “justices [become] far-sighted individuals who are 
wary of their counterpart players in American policy making,” and thus 
craft their decisions with an eye toward actions the legislative and 
executive branches may take in response to those decisions. Mario 
Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court Decision Making: The 
Congressional Constraint, 28 Legis. Stud. Q. 247, 249 (2003).  
58. See, e.g., C. K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp, Politics and 
Judgment in Federal District Courts 136–51 (1996) (identifying 
shortcomings and biases inherent in the behavioral paradigm 
traditionally used to evaluate judicial behavior and suggesting that a 
revised model should take into consideration factors including the fact-
finding process trial judges use to reach a decision in each case); Harry 
T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That 
Attempt to Understand The Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 
58 Duke L.J. 1895, 1905 (2009) (positing that despite “recent 
improvements in empirical studies, significant challenges remain”); 
Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and 
How Should We Measure It?, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 133, 135 
(2009) (observing that “skepticism of the empirical literature on judicial 
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“[f]requently the law is clear, and the judges should and will simply 
implement it,” regardless of the judges’ jurisprudential, political, or 
personal leanings.59  
Regardless of whether the “science” of discerning judicial bias 
remains grounded in its own preconceived bias about the influence of 
politics on the courts and regardless of whether methodological errors 
or other limitations affect empiricist conclusions, the theory of judicial 
predictability based on the judges’ political attitudes has gained wide 
acceptance. Contemporary news media frequently focus on the 
political ideology, gender, or other factors unique to the judge or 
judges rendering a newsworthy decision.60 News media also commonly 
identify the President who appointed the lower court judge rendering 
a decision in high-profile and controversial cases.61 No further 
explanation is offered in these news reports, nor is one necessary, 
regarding the relationship between the decision rendered and the 
assumed judicial ideology that purportedly preordained—or that 
 
ideology cannot be wholly dismissed as the product of ignorance or self-
interest on the part of the audience”); Patricia M. Wald, A Response to 
Tiller and Cross, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 235 (1999) (questioning the 
assumptions empiricists make about how judges decide cases). 
59. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 5 (2006); see also Virginia A. 
Hettinger et al., Judging on a Collegial Court: Influences on 
Federal Appellate Decision Making 34 (2006) (explaining that “a 
significant proportion” of cases reviewed by federal court of appeals 
judges “do not raise issues that are matters of first impression or [are] 
otherwise legally consequential,” and therefore “do not raise questions 
sufficiently salient to elicit much reaction from the judges deciding 
them”). 
60. See, e.g., Diane S. Sykes, Gender and Judging, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 1381, 
1384–86 (2011) (describing media and public fixation on the gender split 
among Wisconsin Supreme Court justices in a case challenging the 
constitutionality of a lower court decision ordering a father of nine 
children not to have more children as a condition of his probation 
following his guilty plea on three felony counts of intentional nonsupport 
of existing children). 
61. See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, Editorial, A Victory for Self-Defense: In the 
D.C. Gun Law Case, a Chance to Affirm the Second Amendment, 
Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 2007, at A13 (opining on a recent D.C. Circuit 
decision that struck down the District of Columbia’s gun control laws 
and mentioning that “Senior Judge Laurence H. Silberman wrote the 
majority opinion, joined by Judge Thomas B. Griffith, a recent Bush 
appointee”); Ian Millhiser, Reagan-Appointed Appeals Court Judge 
Rejects Religious Employer’s Attack on Birth Control Rules, 
ThinkProgress (July 29, 2013, 12:31 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
justice/2013/07/29/2373021/reagan-appointed-appeals-court-judge-reject
s-religious-employers-attack-on-birth-control-rules/# (commenting that 
“George W. Bush appointee Kent Jordan dissented from the panel’s 
decision”).  
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contradicts—the decision rendered. The public has accepted a 
correlation between politics and judicial decision making.62 The 
public’s view is arguably confirmed by the great weight of empirical 
studies on judicial decision making in general and decision making 
involving LGBT litigants in particular.  
a. General Empirical Analyses 
Empiricists have toiled for years to isolate and quantify the 
factors that influence judges, seeking to identify a statistically 
significant link between jurists’ perceived ideologies and demographic 
traits and those jurists’ opinions.63 For more than seven decades, 
political scientists and other researchers have employed quantitative 
and qualitative methodologies to explain how judges resolve cases, 
often focusing on the attitudinal characteristics assigned to U.S. 
Supreme Court justices.64 Judge Richard Posner, for example, 
identified nine theories which purport to explain judicial behavior, all 
of which he considers “overstated or incomplete.”65 
 
62. In a national public opinion poll sponsored by the New York Times and 
CBS News that was conducted from May 31 to June 3, 2012, for 
example, seventy-six percent of respondents believed that the U.S. 
Supreme Court decides cases based on the individual justices’ personal 
and political views, while only thirteen percent of respondents thought 
the decisions were rendered based on “legal analysis.” CBS News/New 
York Times Poll: May 31–June 3, 2012, CBS News (June 7, 2012), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/CBSNYTPoll_health_care_0607
12.pdf.  
63. See generally The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior, supra note 36. 
64. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy & C. Herman Pritchett, Courts, 
Judges, and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process 
(1961); Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes 
and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946–1963, at 6–7 
(1965) (discussing early research on judicial decision making); 
Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind Revisited: Psychometric 
Analysis of Supreme Court Ideology (1974) (updating and refining 
Schubert’s earlier work by employing psychological theory to construct 
an empirical inventory of decisions that define the political ideologies of 
individual Supreme Court justices focusing primarily on the 1953–1969 
period in which Earl Warren served as chief justice and confirming 
correlations between ideology and voting record); C. Herman Pritchett, 
Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–
1941, 35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 890 (1941) (presenting pioneering work in 
the area of empirical analysis of judicial decision making); Martin 
Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 Ky. L.J. 294 (1964) (discussing 
political influences on judicial decision making). 
65. Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 19 (2008) (identifying the 
nine theories as “the attitudinal, the strategic, the sociological, the 
psychological, the economic, the organizational, the pragmatic, the 
phenomenological and . . . the legalist”). Posner’s use of the term 
“legalist” might be called “formalist” by other commentators. Id. at 7.  
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The self-labeling of this discipline as “political jurisprudence” and 
“judicial politics” signaled the researchers’ preconception that judges 
are political animals who are, in whole or in part, incapable or 
unwilling to fulfill the roles of independent actors.66 It is perhaps not 
surprising, then, that the empiricists within this discipline have found 
strong correlations between judicial ideology and decision making, 
focusing intensively on the liberal-conservative divides among U.S. 
Supreme Court justices.67 This attitudinal paradigm of judicial 
decision making is explained by two of its advocates as follows: 
This model holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in 
light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes 
and values of the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way 
he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted 
the way he did because he was extremely liberal.68  
Some empiricists offer more nuanced conclusions on the correlation 
between ideology and judicial decisions. Professor Frank Cross, for 
example, conducted extensive empirical review of 18,000 federal 
appellate decisions. Due to the sheer volume of cases heard by the 
circuit courts compared to the Supreme Court, Cross posits that these 
 
66. See Tamanaha, supra note 54, at 111–55 (discussing political 
jurisprudence and potential preconceptions of the researchers); Nancy 
Maveety, The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political 
Science, in The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior, supra note 36, at 1, 
31 (explaining the development of political science as a discipline and 
the evolution of the study of judicial behavior, which at times was 
“overshadowed by vehement methodological struggles and attendant 
theoretical battles”). 
67. See, e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study 
in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937–1947, at 6–9 (1948) 
(indicating that President Roosevelt responded to a series of 4–5 
Supreme Court decisions “preclud[ing] legislative intervention in 
economic and social affairs” by an unsuccessful attempt to increase the 
number of judges on the Supreme Court); Sunstein et al., supra note 
59, at 147 (reporting the finding of “striking evidence of a relationship 
between the political party of the appointing president and judicial 
voting patterns”). But see Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does 
Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 102 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 369 (2008) 
(demonstrating the effect of legal factors that influence justices’ 
decisions). 
68. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 56, at 86; see also Corey Rayburn Yung, 
Beyond Ideology: An Empirical Study of Partisanship and Independence 
in the Federal Courts, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 505 (2012) (arguing 
that judges’ political ideology is over-weighted in most empirical studies 
of judicial decision making and employing additional regression analysis 
metrics of “partisanship” and “independence” to provide more finely 
tuned analysis). 
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intermediate appellate courts “play by far the greatest legal policy-
making role in the U.S. legal system.”69  
Cross concluded that “judicial decision making clearly involves a 
mix that includes some ideological influence, considerable legal 
influence, and undoubtedly other factors.” 70 Cross observed that while 
ideology, life experiences, gender, economic status, religion, and other 
factors may influence judges to a degree,71 legal rules “matter greatly” 
in case outcomes.72 This proved especially true when courts applied 
rules and doctrines to threshold, and often determinative, matters of 
“jurisdiction, standing, mootness, exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, and the political question doctrine.”73  
Additional research on federal circuit courts suggests that that 
judges tend to follow rule of law unless applicable law is unsettled,74 
and only cases with unclear precedent reveal trends based on political 
ideology and other factors.75 Other data analyses found that federal 
circuit courts are appropriately deferential to district court decisions 
based on the applicable standard of review, another indicator 
undermining the ideology-outcome correlation.76 However, other 
studies conclude that the liberal-conservative attitudinal view of 
judges serving on three-judge appellate panels predicts voting patterns 
more strongly in some types of cases than in others, including cases 
involving the rights of LGBT litigants.77 
By studying the opinions issued by three-judge appellate panels, 
researchers further identified decision-making influences grounded in 
 
69. Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals 2 (2007). 
70. Id. at 177.  
71. Id. at 75–89. 
72. Id. at 67. 
73. Id. at 179. 
74. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 59, at 5 (observing that when 
the applicable law is clear judges “will simply implement it,” regardless 
of their ideology). 
75. Id. at 17–45.  
76. Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of 
Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 20–21 
(2011) (providing an empirical analysis of circuit court decisions that 
reveals a strong correlation between the level of deference required by a 
standard of review and the rate of appellate reversal). 
77. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 59, at 20–21 tbl.2-1 (illustrating 
that examining voting patterns of judges appointed by Democrat and 
Republican presidents on twenty-three topics vary greatly on matters 
involving gay and lesbian rights, affirmative action, and capital 
punishment, but those voting patterns are much closer on criminal 
appeals, takings cases, and punitive damages).  
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institutional structure rather than the attitudinal views of the 
judges.78 One team of researchers labeled this phenomenon as 
“ideological dampening” and “ideological amplification.”79 Dampening 
occurs when, for example, a Republican judge with a conservative 
ideology sits with two Democratic judges with a more liberal 
perspective on the law.80 The conservative judge is more likely to vote 
with the liberal colleagues in that circumstance. Data confirms that 
“Republican appointees look rather like Democratic appointees when 
they sit with only Democratic appointees, and Democratic appointees, 
in the presence of Republican appointees, turn out to look like 
Republican appointees.”81 Amplification occurs when all three judges 
share the same ideology, thereby reinforcing their tendency to vote in 
a stereotypical fashion.82  
Other institutional factors empiricists identify include appellate 
judges’ status and tenure on the court (for example, temporary 
appointment, new judge, seasoned jurist, or chief judge) and previous 
judicial experience as influencing judicial opinions.83 Norms unique to 
a particular appellate court—for example the tendency not to dissent 
and the size of the court—may also influence the decision-making 
process.84 Empirical data has even linked judges’ eating and break 
patterns with the degree of mercy shown in those decisions 
throughout the day.85 
Data on trial courts is, of course, critical to understanding the 
extent of judicial bias in the United States. Due to the sheer number 
of litigants who appear before trial courts and the relatively small 
 
78. See, e,g., Cross, supra note 69, at 148–77. Cross concludes that “panel 
effects are enormously important in determining the judge’s vote and 
the case outcome.” Id. at 176–77. 
79. Sunstein et al., supra note 59, at 8–10. 
80. Id. at 8–9. 
81. Id. at 54. 
82. Id. at 9–10. 
83. Hettinger et al., supra note 59, at 33–34; see also Coffin, supra 
note 38, at 197 (observing based on personal experience that “judges on 
the same kind and level of court develop thought patterns peculiar to 
that particular court” which may include certain “moral 
judgments, . . . social policy, and sometimes even philosophical 
convictions”). 
84. HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 59, at 34–35. 
85. Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 
Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 6889 (2011) (concluding from extensive study 
of judicial decisions in parole board hearings that “the likelihood of a 
favorable ruling is greater at the very beginning of the work day or after 
a food break than later in the sequence of cases” and explaining how 
other factors that may influence the judges’ decisions). 
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number of cases appealed, more “justice” is dispensed by trial level 
courts than intermediate appellate and state and federal courts of last 
resort.86 In addition, the “broad formulations and resulting ambiguity 
that characterize most higher court rulings, especially those of the 
Supreme Court,”87 vest considerable discretion in trial courts to 
interpret and apply the law. This is especially true when procedural 
rules have a significant, and even determinative, impact on the case.88 
Although limited in scope, analysis of trial level court decisions 
tends to confirm that “to an impressive degree the voting patterns of 
district court judges do reflect the political values of their appointing 
presidents.”89 An analysis of federal trial court decisions through 1996, 
for example, demonstrated that 79.1% of decisions rendered by judges 
appointed by Democratic President James Carter resulted in 
extension of voting rights, while 38.8% of the decisions rendered by 
Republican President Ronald Reagan appointees extended those 
rights.90 Similarly, Carter appointees voted in favor of affirmative 
action 87.5% of the time compared to 40% by Reagan appointees.91  
On the perennially controversial topic of abortion, Carter 
appointees voted pro-choice 76.4% of the time, while Reagan 
appointees did so 46.1% of the time.92 Other studies have identified 
geographical factors that tend to predict judicial voting patterns, 
frequently focusing on the differences between judges north (more 
liberal) and south (more conservative) of the Mason-Dixon line, and 
 
86. In 2012, for example, 271,572 cases were terminated by federal district 
courts. Caseload Statistics 2013, USCourts.gov, tbl.C, http://www.us
courts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C00Se
p12.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (reporting statistics for U.S. District 
Courts’ “Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 
12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2011 and 2012”). Only 57,501 
cases were appealed that year. Id. at tbl.B (reporting statistics for U.S. 
Courts of Appeals’ “Appeals Commenced, Terminated, and Pending 
During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2012 and 2013”). 
87. Lyles, supra note 25, at 3. 
88. Jack B. Weinstein, The Roles of a Federal District Court Judge, 76 
Brook. L. Rev. 439, 448 (2011) (remarking that “the substantive 
balance between parties—what benefits they can expect from 
litigation—may be affected by applicable procedure, making it easier or 
harder to prosecute or defend, or to delay or expedite, an action”). 
89. Robert A. Carp & C. K. Rowland, Policymaking and Politics 
in the Federal District Courts 53 (1983); see also Rowland & 
Carp, supra note 58, at 21 (updating and confirming their earlier 
conclusion). 
90. Lyles, supra note 25, at 219 tbl.7.5. 
91. Id. at 215 tbl.7.3. 
92. Id. at 210 tbl.7.1. 
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the contrast between judges in urban (more liberal) and rural (more 
conservative) areas.93  
b. Empirical Analyses of Decisions Involving LGBT Litigants 
Social scientist and attorney Daniel Pinello analyzed 468 state 
and federal appellate court decisions rendered in the 1980s and 1990s 
that involved LGBT litigants.94 He isolated factors that both sustain 
and challenge the notion that the judges rendering these decisions 
embraced judicial independence as a core value.  
Pinello concluded that trial and intermediate appellate courts 
respected precedent and applied it when available.95 Framed in 
judicial independence terms, these courts adhered to the “rule of law” 
if one existed. Pinello also observed that judges seemed to respect the 
facts of each case when applying the law.96 
Pinello’s conclusions contain a number of points affirming the 
attitudinal model of judicial decision making. For example, female97 
and racial minority98 judges produced many of the decisions favoring 
LGBT litigants. Jewish judges rendered more decisions favorable to 
LGBT litigants and Catholic judges rendered more unfavorable 
decisions.99 Younger judges issued more pro-LGBT decisions than 
their more seasoned counterparts.100 Political ideology also appeared 
highly correlative to outcome, as judges appointed by Democratic 
presidents were significantly more receptive to the equality claims of 
LGBT litigants than Republican appointees.101 
Other researchers studied twenty-two U.S. Circuit Court decisions 
involving lesbian or gay litigants decided between 1980 and 2005. 
They concluded that individual judges appointed by Democratic (and 
thus arguably more liberal) presidents voted in favor of homosexual 
litigants fifty-seven percent of the time.102 Their arguably more 
conservative Republican counterparts did so in only sixteen percent of 
 
93. Rowland & Carp, supra note 58, at 58–86. 
94. Daniel R. Pinello, Gay Rights and American Law 76–93 (2003). 
95. Id. at 79, 82, 150. 
96. Id. at 79. It is not clear whether Pinello’s methodology specifically 
screened for the possible judicial selectivity of facts or issue selection, 
two common threats to judicial independence described above.  
97. Id. at 88. 
98. Id. at 87. 
99. Id. at 88–91. 
100. Id. at 91. 
101. Id. at 114–15, 151–52. 
102. Sunstein et al., supra note 59, at 20–21, 57 tbl.2-1. 
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the cases.103 In addition, a three-judge Democratic panel was seven 
times more likely to vote in favor of a lesbian or gay party than a 
panel of three Republicans.104 These data represented the greatest gap 
between liberal and conservative judges in all twenty-three categories 
of cases examined, including highly controversial matters such as 
affirmative action, abortion, and capital punishment. The researchers 
observed: 
Hence, we find extremely strong evidence of ideological voting—
the strongest evidence, in terms of raw percentages, of all our 
case categories. Indeed, the party difference is so marked that it 
is statistically significant even with this small sample of cases. 
Perhaps this is unsurprising, because the issue of gay and 
lesbian rights causes intense political conflict in general.105 
3. Additional Theories of Judicial Decision Making  
Existence of empirical data has not convinced all modern theorists 
that the attitudinal or strategic models of judicial decision making are 
sound. Judge Richard Posner, for example, rejects theories of legalism 
(his term roughly analogous to formalism), extreme attitudinalism, 
and other judicial decision-making theories in favor of casting judges 
as pragmatists. While recognizing “that there is a pronounced 
political element in the decisions of American judges,”106 Posner also 
concludes that “constrained pragmatist” is the term “that best 
describes the average American judge at all levels of our judicial 
hierarchy and yields the greatest insights into his behavior.”107  
According to Judge Posner, the pragmatic judge (1) considers the 
consequences of his decision not only to the parties in the case but 
also the broader institutional and societal consequences;108 (2) rejects 
the unsupported claims of legal realists (formalists) that legislatures 
are capable of regularly altering law to keep up with changing 
times;109 (3) astutely identifies false claims that two equally valuable 
competing interests are at stake;110 (4) searches for the discernible 
 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 57. Because the sample size was small, the researchers could not 
determine whether amplification or dampening of political ideology 
occurred due to the specific composition of the three-judge panels when, 
for example, two Democrats sat with a Republican, or vice versa. Id. 
106. Posner, supra note 65, at 369. 
107. Id. at 231. 
108. Id. at 238, 242–43. 
109. Id. at 240. 
110. Id. at 242–43. 
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purpose of the rule being applied when the scope of application is 
uncertain;111 (5) favors deciding cases on narrow rather than broad 
grounds, especially “in the early stages of the evolution of a legal 
doctrine”;112 and (6) recognizes that legal reasoning is not 
distinguishable from “ordinary, everyday reasoning” that takes into 
account the actual benefits and costs of a decision and moves beyond 
the parties’ rhetoric to examine and rely upon the facts and data 
presented in the case.113 While recognizing the validity of labeling the 
U.S. Supreme Court as a political court, Judge Posner posits that the 
justices are still pragmatists, as they often appear driven by the 
political consequences of their decisions.114 
After exploring much (but by no means all) of the vast literature 
on the realism-formalism debate and other schools of thought, the 
view articulated by Professor Brian Tamanaha proves particularly 
compelling. Tamanaha writes that “the story about the legal 
formalists is highly an invention, and legal realism is substantially 
misapprehended.”115 Stated simply, most judicial decision making 
occurs near the middle of a spectrum anchored at opposite ends by 
realism and formalism. Judicial decisions are also greatly informed by 
the unique facts and law of each case. Tamanaha employs the term 
“balanced realism”116 to describe what is perhaps the most common 
approach to judicial decision making, past and present. Tamanaha 
concludes: 
Judges are unique individuals with bents, biases, and various 
strengths and limitations, as well as differences in moral and 
political views, and differing views of judging (beyond a 
common core). These aspects . . . combine to create a zone of 
 
111. Id. at 245. 
112. Id. at 246. 
113. Id. at 248.  
114. Id. at 269. 
115. Tamanaha, supra note 54, at 3. Tamanaha deconstructs the history and 
rationales that have long been associated with the formalist and realist 
views of American law and makes a strong case for blurring the lines 
that separate these allegedly disparate periods of U.S. legal history. He 
rejects the claim “that judges in the ‘formalistic age’ reasoned in a 
bizarrely mechanical manner unlike judges before or after them,” and 
makes an equally compelling case that “[v]irtually every one of the core 
insights about judging now associated with the realists was prominently 
stated decades before, often by historical jurists.” Id. at 43, 79.  
116. Id. at 8; see also Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins 
(Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 213 (2009) 
(explaining that both formalism and realism are entrenched in the legal 
system, but “neither is adequate to describe the ways in which lawyers, 
judges, or legal academics reason, interpret, or elaborate law”). 
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uncertainty and variation in judicial decision making. It has 
always been so. Nonetheless, legal rules frequently work and 
judges frequently render rule-bound decisions.117  
4. In Their Own Words: How Judges Decide Cases 
“Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer 
wisely, to consider soberly, and to decide impartially.”118 
“If it were only that simple.”119 
a. Acknowledging the Obvious  
Insightful explanations of how judges decide cases are found in 
the words of the jurists themselves.120 A common judicial revelation is 
that each jurist holds a worldview molded from his or her life 
experiences and the shared perspectives of family, friends, colleagues, 
and others with whom they interact. Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes famously explained:  
“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. 
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and 
political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed or 
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their 
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism 
in determining the rules by which men should be governed.”121 
Benjamin Cardozo similarly acknowledged that every judge has an 
underlying philosophy,122 and despite valiant efforts to see things 
objectively, “we can never see them with any eyes except our own.”123 
To the contrary, “[d]eep below consciousness are other forces, the likes 
and dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of 
instincts and emotions and habit and convictions, which make the 
man, whether he be litigant or judge.”124 
 
117. Tamanaha, supra note 54, at 187.  
118. Thomas G. Saylor, On the Nature of Judging: First Annual Jurist in 
Residence Lecture, 20 Widener L.J. 681, 682 (2011) (quoting 
Socrates). 
119. Id. (presenting Judge Saylor’s reflection on Socrates’ observation). 
120. See generally Judges on Judging, supra note 22 (containing speeches 
and essays from historically significant and contemporary judges). 
121. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881). 
122. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 12 
(1921).  
123. Id. at 13. 
124. Id. at 167. 
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Affirming the insights of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, a contemporary state supreme court justice explained the 
process this way:  
[J]udging is a craft, not a science. In performing their work, 
judges bring to bear their experience and practical knowledge, 
honed by habit and informed by common understanding. 
Although the precise manner in which they do this is difficult to 
describe, the end of the endeavor is not. Judges, wrote Justice 
Frankfurter, are called upon for “allegiance to nothing except 
the [effort], amid tangled words, amid limited insights, . . . to 
find their path through precedent, through policy, through 
history, . . . to the best judgment that poor fallible creatures 
can arrive at in that most difficult of all tasks, the [achievement 
of justice] between man and man, between man and state, 
through reason called law.”125  
Judge Diane S. Sykes reframed these truisms succinctly: “it goes 
without saying that judges do not shed their life experiences when 
they put on the robe.”126 
The candid reflections of the judges quoted above are confirmed 
by empirical evidence. A survey of federal district court judges 
revealed that 6.6% of respondents “often” and fifty-one percent 
“sometimes” felt that their personal attitudes and values affected 
their discretionary judgments.127 An even higher number—9.2% 
“often” and 64.1% “sometimes”—felt that other judges’ decisions were 
affected by those judges’ personal attitudes and values.128 As 
explained in Part I.B.4.b, some judges reject the portraits painted by 
this study, or at least call for a more nuanced understanding of the 
many factors affecting the judicial decision-making process.  
b. Commitment to Neutrality: Personal and Institutional Restraints  
While acknowledging that “moral values, ideas of social utility, 
and philosophical insights occasionally play a significant role” in 
judicial decision making, Judge Frank Coffin believed that “a case on 
point or clearly analogous, analysis of the evidence . . . , a procedural 
or jurisdictional requirement, a compelling public policy, a close 
 
125. Saylor, supra note 118, at 696 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices 
I Have Known, 39 Va. L. Rev. 883, 905 (1953)). 
126. Sykes, supra note 60, at 1388. 
127. Lyles, supra note 25, at 21 tbls.2 & 3. The survey was conducted in 
1992 and 1993 and over sixty percent of federal district judges 
responded. Id. at 275.  
128. Id. at 21 tbls.2 & 3. 
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reading of legislative history, and considerations of institutional 
appropriateness will in the end decide most cases.”129  
Judge Sykes echoed Judge Coffin’s sentiment. “Of course judges 
have life experiences and philosophical views that affect their 
understanding of the cases they must decide, and some of these may 
be linked to gender, race, or ethnicity,”130 Judge Sykes posits. “Good 
judges will constantly check for these influences and deal with them 
judiciously, consistent with the obligations of the judicial oath of 
office.”131 She opines that judges accept their assigned role of 
rendering decisions “based on factors external to themselves: the 
legally salient facts of the case and the most faithful reading of the 
constitution and laws, applicable precedent, and accepted principles of 
legal interpretation.”132 
Despite the challenges of confronting inherent and perhaps even 
unconscious biases when deciding cases, the vast majority of judges 
who have voiced an opinion on the judicial decision-making process 
appear to agree with Judges Coffin and Sykes: judicial officers commit 
to resolving each issue and case as neutrally as humanly possible. 
Judges also recognize and respect various internal and external 
constraints on their decision-making authority.  
As Judge Cardozo explained, although judges “cannot transcend 
the limitations of the ego and see anything as it actually is, . . . the 
ideal is one to be striven for within the limits of our capacity.”133 And 
limitations on exercises of judicial ego do exist, even in the ubiquitous 
realm of judicial discretion. Cardozo explained: 
The judge, even when he is free, is not wholly free . . . . He is 
not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of 
beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from 
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic 
sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to 
exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by 
analogy, [and] disciplined by system, and subordinated to “the 
primordial necessity of order in the social life.”134 
 
129. Coffin, supra note 38, at 196; see also id. at 199–203 (expanding on the 
role of judges’ values and background in judicial decision making). 
130. Sykes, supra note 60, at 1390.  
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 1388. 
133. Cardozo, supra note 122, at 106. 
134. Id. at 141 (quoting 2 FRANCIOS GENY, METHODE D’INTERPRETATION ET 
SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF § 200 (1899) (quoted to and 
translated by Benjamin N. Cardozo)). 
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Like Judge Cardozo, Judge Alex Kozinski readily acknowledges that 
judges at every level possess considerable discretion, but he also 
identifies three “very significant restraints” on the exercise of that 
discretion.135  
The first constraint is self-respect. “Judges have to look in the 
mirror at least once a day, just like everyone else,” Judge Kozinski 
explains. “[T]hey have to like what they see.”136 Judges who choose to 
abandon principle to reach a result will have to do so by deliberate 
choice, a choice that, by and large, judges tend not to make.137 The 
second constraint is imposed by judicial colleagues. Trial judges face 
review by three-judge appellate panels, and court of appeals judges 
must persuade others to join their opinions.138 When a litigant seeks 
en banc review, the writing judge’s “shortcuts, errors and oversights 
are mercilessly paraded before the entire court.”139 Flawed opinions 
also invite stinging dissents that highlight the writing judge’s 
shortcomings.140 The final constraint “often overlooked but awesome 
nonetheless” is the political reaction to decisions, either via legislation 
invalidating the opinion or removal of judges from office.141  
Judge Coffin identified the near-universal requirement that judges 
render public, written decisions as another institutional constraint on 
judicial decision making.142 When reciting the relevant facts, 
applicable law, legal logic, and overriding policy supporting the 
resolution of a case a judge may realize that the result “looks different 
when dressed up in written words and sent out into the sunlight.”143 
Judges may discover that what appeared to be sound reasoning 
supporting a particular outcome is seriously flawed, and the opinion 
“simply ‘won’t write.’”144  
 
135. Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial 
Decision Making, in Judges on Judging, supra note 22, at 115, 116. 
136. Id. 
137. Id.  
138. Id. at 116–17; see also Coffin, supra note 38, at 58 (observing that 
“almost everything an appellate judge is called upon to do he must do 
with his colleagues”). 
139. Kozinski, supra note 135, at 117. 
140. Id.  
141. Id. 
142. Coffin, supra note 38, at 57; see also Saylor, supra note 118, at 681–82 
(explaining “that in the area of constitutional interpretation . . . a court 
makes difficult choices among competing values, and [then is] obliged by 
tradition and compelled by institutional necessity, to supply reasons for 
such choices”). 
143. Coffin, supra note 38, at 57. 
144. Id. 
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Judge Coffin concluded that “[t]he act of writing tells us what 
was wrong with the act of thinking.”145 An opinion is defendable only 
if it “marshals facts and precedents, logic and analogy, and broad 
policy implications of the decision in contemporary society so that the 
result is seen as fair, expectable, and perhaps even inevitable.”146  
Judge Jack B. Weinstein echoed Judge Coffin’s observations. 
“Ultimately,” Judge Weinstein states, “it is the trial judge’s 
conscience, exercised under the constraints of our rule of law, that 
guides the pen writing an opinion justifying a judgment.”147 
Judge Patricia Wald identified additional constraints on judicial 
decision making, including “the formidable Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Criminal Procedure and Evidence,” and “[p]ermanently 
recorded and widely disseminated opinions [that] also make for 
responsible judgments, as do the oral processes of court arguments 
and the scrutiny of a regular and alert bar trained in the same legal 
culture as the judges.”148 Judge Wald also characterized “[t]he press 
and academic criticism” as additional and “powerful tools to make a 
judge think hard about her rulings.”149 
c. Activism 
“History has taught . . . that political parties support judicial 
independence as long as their interests are the same, but as soon 
as their interests diverge, they decry judges as activists 
overreaching their power.”150 
Claims of judicial activism have long been a subject of heated 
political discourse,151 but in recent years have reached a fevered pitch. 
Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor posits that “the 
breadth and intensity of rage currently being leveled at the judiciary 
 
145. Id.; see also Weinstein, supra note 88, at 453–54 (concluding that a 
“candid statement of the reasoning supporting the trial court’s decision 
is always required” and that “[m]endacity in twisting the facts, evidence, 
history, or legal background to arrive at a conclusion is not 
acceptable”). 
146. Coffin, supra note 38, at 196. 
147. Weinstein, supra note 88, at 454. 
148. Wald, supra note 21, at 232. 
149. Id. at 231. 
150. Baer, supra note 33, at 77. 
151. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The 
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977) 
(criticizing the Supreme Court for continuously revising the 
Constitution while claiming only to be interpreting it and arguing that 
the Court should exercise restraint by employing an “original 
internationalist” approach).  
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may be unmatched in American history.”152 Professor Friedman 
observed that the newest twist on judicial activism claims is that “for 
the first time in American history, the Supreme Court’s power of 
judicial review has come under siege simultaneously from both sides of 
the ideological spectrum.”153  
Similarly, the ability of political operatives to effectively harness 
public unrest about the power of the judiciary has reached new 
heights. The “judicial activism” mantra became the focal point for the 
well-orchestrated, well-financed, and successful fall 2010 campaign to 
oust three Iowa Supreme Court justices who, along with four of their 
colleagues, had unanimously ruled that the state’s constitution 
required marriage equality for same-sex couples.154 No other Iowa 
Supreme Court justice, appellate judge, or district judge had lost a 
retention bid since 1962 when Iowa adopted its current judicial 
selection and retention system.155 Election experts offered assurance 
that the rule of law was not endangered by the results of a single 
election in Iowa,156 but they also tended to agree that “‘[w]hat 
happened in Iowa cannot help but give a temporary chill to other 
courts when faced with such a highly charged political issue as gay 
marriage.’”157 Efforts to oust a fourth Iowa Supreme Court justice who 
joined the court’s marriage equality decision proved unsuccessful.158   
152. Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed., The Threat to Judicial Independence, 
Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at A18. 
153. Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion 
Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of 
the Constitution 7 (2009); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in 
Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for 
America (2005) (critiquing courts from a liberal perspective); Mark R. 
Levin, Men in Black: How the Supreme Court Is Destroying 
America (2005) (critiquing courts from a conservative view point). 
154. Mark Curriden, Judging the Judges: Landmark Iowa Elections Send a 
Tremor Through the Judicial Retention System, 95 A.B.A. J. 56 (2011); 
Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster 
of Three Justices, 59 U. Kan. L. Rev. 715 (2011). 
155. Curriden, supra note 154, at 56.  
156. Id. at 56–57 (quoting a number of professors and judges including New 
York University School of Law’s Professor Berry Friedman and the 
Indiana Supreme Court’s Chief Justice Randall Shepard). 
157. Id. at 56 (quoting Professor Friedman).  
158. Beth Dalbey, Election 2012: Iowans Reverse Trend, Retain Supreme 
Court Justice Who Ruled on Same-Sex Marriage, West Des Moines 
Patch (Nov. 7, 2012, 6:31 AM), http://westdesmoines.patch.com/group
s/politics-and-elections/p/election-2012-judicial-retention-vote (reporting 
that Judge David Wiggins received a fifty-four percent approval vote, 
compared to approximately seventy-four percent approval vote garnered 
by each of the three justices appointed to replace the justices voted out 
of office in 2010 due to their marriage-equality decision). 
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The heart of the judicial activism debate lies in the fact that 
“[o]ver the course of two centuries, the Supreme Court has 
successfully asserted that it and it alone has the final say on the 
constitutionality of the elected branches of national government and 
all branches of state government.”159 The highest courts of the various 
states have similarly assumed the role of ultimate arbiters of laws 
enacted by elected legislators and decisions made by elected members 
of the executive branch. State and federal courts also routinely review 
ballot initiatives for constitutional and procedural flaws, thus imbuing 
the judiciary with powers superior to “the people” in whom the U.S. 
and state constitutions purport to vest the greatest power.160 
“Understandably, this strikes many people as a peculiar arrangement 
for a nation that claims to be a democracy.”161 Advocates of “judicial 
restraint” predict dire consequences, including the emasculation of 
fundamental doctrines and undermining of separation of powers if 
activism is left unchecked.162  
1. In Search of a Definition 
Terms such as activist judges and judicial activism belie a single 
definition. One widely accepted meaning is “deciding a case contrary 
to the plain meaning of the Constitution [or other applicable law] in 
order to promote the judge’s political preferences.”163 Some scholars  
159. Frederick P. Lewis, The Context of Judicial Activism: The 
Endurance of The Warren Court Legacy in a Conservative 
Age 5 (1999). Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), in which the Court declared 
itself superior to the supposedly co-equal legislative and executive 
branches of federal government on issues requiring constitutional 
interpretation, is often cited as among the earliest and most enduring 
examples of judicial activism. See, e.g., id. at 8. Sharply contrasting 
views of the proper approach to judicial review are provided in the 
classic works of John Hart Ely and Raoul Berger. Compare John Hart 
Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
103 (1980) (arguing that the Court functions legitimately when it strikes 
down laws or practices that are designed to allow those in power to hold 
onto that power by “choking off the channels of political change” or 
when representatives of the majority disadvantage a minority out of 
hostility or prejudice), with Berger, supra note 151 (advocating for 
courts to rely more heavily on the original intent of the framers of the 
Constitution and contending that the Supreme Court has rewritten in 
the Constitution while claiming merely to be interpreting it). 
160. See generally Lori J. Rankin, Ballot Initiatives and Gay Rights: Equal 
Protection Challenges to the Right’s Campaign Against Lesbians and 
Gay Men, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1055 (1994). 
161. Lewis, supra note 159. 
162. Wallace, supra note 22, at 214. 
163. Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Judicial Activism: Making 
Sense of Supreme Court Decisions 38 (2006). 
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have used the concept “simply to characterize a Court willing to use 
its authority to engage in judicial review in an assertive manner,” 
with such assertiveness implying “a considerable degree of doctrinal 
pronouncement that is innovative, at least in the sense that it has not 
been explicitly pronounced before.”164 Others define activism by 
identifying a number of outcomes that allegedly prove that activism 
has occurred.165 Judicial activism has also been defined—and 
defended—as “a form of creative constitutional development,”166 and 
an inappropriate embrace of the concept of a “living” or “growing” 
Constitution.167 On the other side, judicial activism has become “a 
code word used to induce public disapproval of a court action that a 
politician opposes, but is powerless to overturn.”168 Such incantations 
affect the public “on an emotional level without provoking any 
reasoned discourse among them.”169 
2. Flaws Inherent in Contemporary “Activism” Label 
Multiple flaws pervade the ubiquitous use of the term “judicial 
activism” to condemn the judicial decision-making process in general 
and a specific judge’s controversial opinion in particular. Part I.C.2 
focuses on just three of those flaws. 
a. Judges Must Judge 
By definition, judges must exercise judgment and often do so in 
situations where applicable law is ill defined or nonexistent. Judges 
must apply both precise legal rules offering bright-line tests and 
intentionally elastic equitable principles featuring vague balancing 
tests.170 And regardless of the source of law at issue—legislative, 
 
164. Lewis, supra note 159, at 7. 
165. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial 
Activism, 66 Judicature 236 (1983) (identifying six scenarios in which 
activism occurs, including the alteration of earlier precedent, 
interpretation of constitutional provisions in a manner contrary to the 
clear intention of the drafters, and establishing policy rather than 
leaving that role to other government agencies).  
166. Lewis, supra note 159, at 89. 
167. Wallace, supra note 22, at 212. 
168. William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, in Judges 
on Judging, supra note 22, at 42, 42; see also Coffin, supra note 38, at 
200 (observing that a judge is often pigeonholed as a model of “judicial 
restraint” or of “judicial activism,” even though the public’s 
understanding of how judges actually decide cases “seems to have 
originated in myth and to be perpetuated by convention”). 
169. Justice, supra note 168. 
170. See Weinstein, supra note 88, at 453 (acknowledging that a “trial court 
is always concerned with the conflict between strict law and flexible 
equity,” as “[a]nalytical purity in chambers favors the former; empathy 
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constitutional, regulatory, or case precedent—the legal authorities 
governing any given case are often inherently ambiguous and 
legitimately capable of multiple interpretations. As former D.C. 
Circuit Chief Judge Patricia M. Wald aptly observed, “Dealing in 
words is a dangerous business . . . . Dealing in long, vague, fuzzy-
meaning words is even more dangerous business, and most of the 
words The Law deals in are long and vague and fuzzy.”171 
Justice Felix Frankfurter’s comments echo Judge Wald’s 
sentiment. He characterized the constitutional guarantees of due 
process and equal protection as “vague and admonitory” and of 
“dubious . . . appropriateness for judicial enforcement.”172 Judge 
Learned Hard similarly admitted to not knowing “what the doctrine is 
as to the scope” of the Due Process Clauses located in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.173 In Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s experience, 
“[o]bscurity of statute or of precedent or of customs or morals, or 
collision between some or all of them, may leave the law unsettled, 
and cast a duty upon the courts to declare it retrospectively in the 
exercise of a power frankly legislative in function.”174  
More recently, the dilemma was framed in these terms: 
“Frequently the law is clear, and judges should and will simply 
implement it . . . . But what happens when the law is unclear? In 
that event, it is hopelessly inadequate to ask judges to ‘follow the 
law.’”175 Lack of clarity in the existence and application of law has 
been a recurring issue in cases involving LGBT litigants due to the 
relatively recent phenomenon of individuals willing to (or forced to) 
acknowledge their minority sexual orientation status and identity.  
Indeed, in LGBT rights and other cases, litigation is often 
initiated because the respective legal rights and duties of the litigants 
are unclear under existing law. But lack of settled law does not justify 
a court’s decision to decline jurisdiction over a contentious and 
politically charged matter. To the contrary, judges “simply are not in 
a position to refuse to respond to proper cases instituted by 
 
in the courtroom for individuals living in an imperfect world leans 
toward the latter”). 
171. Patricia M. Wald, Commencement Address, 32 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1, 8 
(1982) (quoting FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS! 39 (Berkeley 
ed., 1980)). 
172. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 Harv. 
L. Rev. 217, 229, 237 (1955). Lack of clarity extends beyond 
constitutional law to statutory and regulatory law.  
173. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights: The Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Lectures, 1958, at 55 (1960).  
174. Cardozo, supra note 122, at 128.  
175. Sunstein et al., supra note 59, at 5. 
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appropriate parties under provisions of statutory or constitutional 
law.”176 
Similarly, the facts of a case rarely present themselves in the tidy 
and uncontroverted manner suggested by courts’ written disposition 
of cases. A judge must often choose between sharply contrasting 
versions of the events resulting in the litigation. At the trial level, 
courts are intentionally vested with significant discretion to assess the 
relative credibility of the competing versions of reality. Appellate 
courts may revisit the trial court’s credibility decisions to determine 
whether the factual findings are supported by the evidence, albeit 
under the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard.  
b. Judges Must Constrain Legislators  
Judges play a unique role in the checks and balances embedded in 
the U.S. and state constitutions. Contrary to the popular argument 
that judges who strike down legislation inflict severe injuries on a 
democratic form of government, judges are not charged with 
advancing or imposing the will of the majority.177 That role is assigned 
to legislators and elected members of the executive branch.  
As declared by the U.S. Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison,178 
the judicial branch is entrusted with the much more challenging task 
of preventing the “tyranny of the majority” being imposed via 
legislative enactments and other government action on minorities who 
are entitled to enjoy the privileges and protections that the U.S. 
 
176. Phillip J. Cooper, Hard Judicial Choices: Federal District 
Court Judges and State and Local Officials 328 (1988) 
(reflecting on court intervention in matters of public housing, 
desegregation, prison, and mental health placements). 
177. See, e.g., Brian Tashman, Vander Plaats: Entire Iowa Supreme Court 
Must Resign, RightWingWatch.org (Dec. 8, 2010, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/vander-plaats-entire-iowa-supreme
-court-must-resign (explaining Bob Vander Plaats’s argument that judges 
who disregard “the will of the people” harm democracy and should be 
voted out of office). Vander Plaats chaired the “Iowa for Freedom” 
movement that resulted in three Iowa justices losing their retention 
elections due to the Iowa Supreme Court’s unanimous decision that a 
ban on same-sex marriage violated the Iowa Constitution. Id. National 
groups advancing the same argument in Iowa included, among others, 
The American Family Association, The National Organization for 
Marriage, and The Family Research Council. See Patrick Caldwell, 
Disorder in the Court, Am. Prospect, Oct. 2011, at 44, 48. 
178. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326 (1819) 
(expounding upon Supreme Court’s power of review). The power of the 
judiciary to review and invalidate the acts of legislatures and executives 
has been controversial “[t]hroughout history” due to the “chief 
complaint . . . that it interferes with the right of the people to govern 
themselves.” Friedman, supra note 153, at 5. 
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Constitution promises to all.179 Accordingly, “the judicial branch is 
responsible for resolving disputes between citizens and their 
government, including claims by citizens that the government has 
violated their constitutional rights.”180 The courts will continue to 
fulfill that critical role absent the Supreme Court’s reversal of 
Marbury or the equally unlikely event of a Constitution amendment 
stripping courts of the power to review legislative and executive 
acts.181  
Though often subject to criticism, Marbury’s holding is not 
“undemocratic.” Looking back to the genesis of U.S. law deeply 
embedded in the English system, it is obvious that the United States 
never adopted the “one-man, one-vote on most of the crucial issues of 
society’s survival.”182 Rather, the United States has “a rule of law 
growing out of a nine-hundred-year Anglo-American tradition that 
gives us a total process of institutional balance of which one-man, 
one-vote is an integral part.”183 As a result, the form of “democracy” 
employed in the United States “is really remarkable for its 
 
179. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 3 (1971) (explaining that, although majorities 
rule in democratic forms of government, there are nonetheless “areas 
properly left to individual freedom, and coercion by the majority in 
these aspects of life is tyranny”); see also Robert H. Bork, The 
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 139 
(1990) (describing the conflict inherent in the United States between 
self-governance in which majorities rule and constitutional protections 
for “areas of life in which the individual must be free of majority rule”). 
Compared to federal courts in which judges are appointed for life, the 
role of the judiciary in protecting citizens from the tyranny of the 
majority is not quite as controversial in state systems because judges are 
elected or subject to retention votes and thus ultimately answerable to 
the electorate for their decisions.  
180. Ternus, supra note 10, at 480; see also Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed., 
Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2010, at WK9 
(opining that “the judiciary, unlike the legislative and the executive 
branches, is supposed to answer only to the law and the Constitution” 
and is not accountable to campaign donors or ideological groups).  
181. See United States v. Munoz-Florez, 495 U.S. 385, 396–97 (1990) 
(observing that “the principle that the courts will strike down a law 
when Congress has passed it in violation of such a [constitutional] 
command has been well settled for almost two centuries”); see also 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1432 (2012) (citing Munoz-Flores 
for the principle that courts have the power “to resolve the 
constitutionality or propriety of the act of another branch of 
Government”). 
182. Richard Neely, How Courts Govern America 140 (1981).  
183. Id. 
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nondemocracy, that is, its protection of minorities, dissenters, 
incompetents, misfits, and social outcasts.”184  
c. Judges Must Facilitate the Law’s Evolution  
The principles of equality and various personal fundamental 
freedoms are deeply embedded in the U.S. and state constitutions. 
These promises and protections foster significant individual 
autonomy, which in turn produces myriad fact patterns to which 
established legal authorities must be applied. Over time, individual 
and societal change necessitates the transformation of law itself.185 
Surely the framers of the U.S. Constitution and the authors of the 
Fourteenth Amendment could not imagine the concept of “equal 
protection” being applied to women, much less to lesbians, gay men, 
and transgender individuals. As Roscoe Pound explained, mechanical 
application of the law results in its “petrifaction,” inappropriately 
stifling “independent consideration of new problems and of new 
phases of old problems.”186  
II. Judicial Independence and LGBT Litigants  
A. Possible Degrees of Judicial Independence  
It is impossible to calculate precisely the degree of judicial 
independence in any judicial decision. Despite voluminous empirical 
data on judicial decision making, only the judge who rendered the 
decision knows what truly informed his or her decision in that 
particular case. Even then, unconscious factors may have influenced 
the process.187   
184. Id. at 140–41; see also Coffin, supra note 38, at 215–21 (refuting the 
argument that the judicial branch is “undemocratic”). Judge Richard 
Posner takes this logic a step further, arguing that the prevailing 
assumption that populist legislatures only act “with the consent of the 
governed” is unrealistic. Richard A. Posner, What Am I, A Potted 
Plant?: The Case Against Strict Constructionism, in Judges on 
Judging, supra note 22, at 223, 225. To the contrary, Judge Posner 
doubts that the legislative branch routinely reflects majority views when 
it enacts legislation. Speaking from personal experience, Judge Posner 
states that his preferred candidates sometimes fail to be elected, and 
that the winning candidates for which he voted often enacted legislation 
that he disfavors. And “[g]iven the effectiveness of interest groups in the 
political process,” Judge Posner adds, “much of this legislation probably 
didn’t have the consent of a majority of citizens.” Id. 
185. See generally Posner, supra note 184, at 193. 
186. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605, 606 
(1908).  
187. See Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1994) 
(opining “that all judges, as a part of basic human functioning, bring to 
each decision a package of personal biases and beliefs that may 
unconsciously and unintentionally affect the decision making process”). 
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Relative assessments of judicial independence can be attempted 
by identifying the model of judicial decision making that the judge 
appears to have embraced when rendering the decision (e.g., 
pragmatist, oracle, balanced realist, etc.). One can then attempt to 
gauge how near or far that model is from the ideal of judicial 
independence.  
Determining the judicial decision-making model or models the 
judge employed in a particular case is admittedly an inexact 
exercise.188 Nonetheless, in many cases the judge’s attitude regarding 
the dispute at hand, the state of the law, and the litigants is revealed 
in the language of the decision, the judge’s framing (or re-framing) of 
factual and legal issues, the acceptance or rejection of evidence, and 
the judge’s citation to public policy, religious principles, general 
mores, popular opinion, and cultural norms. In appellate cases, 
dissenting and concurring opinions often provide critical insights on 
both the expressed and unexpressed rationales for the majority’s 
decision.  
Ranking the models of judicial decision making relative to judicial 
independence is also a challenging task. The list in Table 1, which 
assigns ranks to each model from most to least independent, works 
within the confines of this Article, although empiricists and other 
scholars who explore judicial decision making may disagree with the 
short-hand definitions assigned each model or the relative position of 
each model.  
 
1 Formalism 
Judge mechanically applies facts to established 
rule(s) of law, rendering decision free of judicial bias. 
2 Balanced 
Realism 
Judge renders decision informed primarily by unique 
facts and law of the case, although factors such as 
political ideology may influence the decision; judge is 
aware of potential biases and tries to control for 
them. 
3 Constrained 
Pragmatism 
Judge decides cases on narrow grounds, especially 
when law is uncertain or evolving, considering 
impact on institutions and society as well as parties. 
4 Realism 
Judge determines outcome first, then selects facts 
and laws that support judge’s desired outcome. 
 
188. In a perfect world the evaluator would possess an encyclopedic 
knowledge of the “rule of law” that was (or should have been) applied in 
the case, conduct a painstaking review of all evidence to determine 
whether the court made appropriate weight and credibility 
determinations, and be able to consider the decision in light of the entire 
body of decisions rendered by the judge. Because we do not live in a 
perfect world, the system described in Part I has been employed.  
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5 Pragmatism 
Judge gives equal or greater weight to the potential 
overall impact of decision on institutions and society 
rather than securing just result for the litigants in 
the case or strictly adhering to precedent.189 
6 Attitudinal 
Judge decides case based on ideological attitudes and 
personal values including religious and political 
influences. 
7 Strategic 
Appellate judge votes in a manner that advances the 
jurist’s larger goals, for example, by trading his or 
her vote in a case about which the judge does not 
feel strongly to secure a colleague’s vote on a case of 
greater importance to the judge; strategic model may 
also be employed by agreeing on a second (or third) 
favorite resolution of a case to avoid an outcome the 
judge dislikes even more, even though the judge 
believes the decision in which he or she is concurring 
is flawed. 
8 Oracle 
Judge divines result of case from largely common law 
“mystical body of permanent truths.”190 
Table 1: Judicial decision-making models ranked closest (1) to 
furthest (8) from judicial independence. 
While these definitions provide one tool for helping us understand 
why judges render specific decisions, all judicial decision-making 
models below constrained pragmatism on Table 1 can arguably fall so 
far short of the ideal of judicial independence that their relative 
rankings are not particularly meaningful. 
B.Demonstrative Failures of Judicial Independence 
Professor Rivera employed a double entendre when characterizing 
U.S. judges who decided cases affecting LGBT equality prior to 1980 
as “straight-laced.”191 No data exist about the sexual orientation of 
these judges, but it is logical to conclude that the vast majority, and 
perhaps all of them, were heterosexual, or, in the vernacular, 
straight.192 In addition, these judges often personified the term 
 
189. This categorization of pragmatism is not intended to suggest that judges 
should never consider the larger impact of their decisions, especially in 
cases where the law is unclear or evolving. But it does suggest that 
courts should not routinely sacrifice the rights of litigants in an effort to 
shape society and institutions in the manner desired by the judge.  
190. White, supra note 37, at 10. 
191. Rivera I, supra note 1, at 799. Also note that most cases were decided 
by judges rather than juries because they involved domestic relations 
matters, constitutional challenges, or both. 
192. Cf. Juliet Eilperin, First Gay U.S. Appeals Judge Confirmed, Wash. 
Post, Sept. 25, 2013, at A2 (noting that just seven openly gay judges 
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straitlaced,193 as they routinely relied on puritanical religious and 
moral codes condemning homosexuality as determinative of the legal 
issues before them.194 The judges readily embraced an attitudinal 
model of decision making by relying on and reinforcing negative 
stereotypes of non-heterosexual litigants. The ideal of judicial 
independence—the objective evaluation of the specific facts of the case 
and the legal authorities that would likely command a different result 
for non-LGBT litigants—was seriously damaged by this approach. 
Historically, judges characterized gay and lesbian individuals as 
undesirable “others” whose presumed sexual perversion, criminal 
propensities, and mental instability warranted disenfranchisement not 
only from legal rights and benefits but from basic dignity and respect 
as well.195 Regardless of the evidence actually adduced at trial, 
automatic condemnation of homosexuals by judicial officers was the 
norm. The attitudinal model was particularly evident in domestic 
 
had been confirmed as federal district judges prior to Hughes’s 
appointment). 
193. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1232 (11th ed. 
2003) (defining the term to mean “excessively strict in manners, morals, 
or opinion”); see also Straitlaced Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/straitlaced (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2014) (offering words like “Victorian” and “puritanical” as 
synonyms). 
194. Judges often cited their state’s sodomy laws as proof that a gay or 
lesbian litigant was automatically a criminal and thus unworthy of equal 
rights under the law. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995), is 
a case in point. Sharon Bottoms was raising her son with her female 
partner when Sharon’s mother sued for custody. The trial judge 
awarded custody to the grandmother and opined: “I will tell you first 
that the mother’s conduct is illegal. It is a Class 6 felony in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. I will tell you that it is the opinion of this 
Court that her conduct is immoral. And it . . . renders her an unfit 
parent.” Id. at 109 (Keenan, J., dissenting) (quoting the trial court 
opinion) (internal quotations omitted). The Virginia Supreme Court 
affirmed, reiterating that the “[c]onduct inherent in lesbianism is 
punishable as a . . . felony.” Id. at 108 (majority opinion). While the 
often contentious relationship of legality and morality is beyond the 
scope of this article, it is worth noting that no evidence was presented in 
Bottoms or the other cases that relied on the sodomy laws 
demonstrating that the litigants had engaged in the illegal behavior 
prohibited by the relevant sodomy statute. In addition, the specific 
behaviors forbidden by sodomy laws varied widely, and the laws were 
very rarely enforced, thus suggesting that the moral and religious 
motivations that initially supported enactment of sodomy laws no longer 
had community support. See generally Cain, supra note 2, at 1587–1608 
(describing far-reaching negative effects of sodomy statutes on lesbian 
and gay litigants). 
195. See generally Nussbaum, supra note 8 (discussing the idea that much 
legal discrimination against gays and lesbians is motivated by disgust). 
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relations cases, especially those involving child custody and visitation 
issues.196 One scholar who studied this phenomenon concluded that 
even parents imprisoned for committing serious crimes were “treated 
to less spurious moralizing and discrimination” than were homosexual 
parents.197 As the new millennium dawned, Professor Rivera revisited 
 
196. See, e.g., Susan J. Becker, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations Against a 
Lesbian or Gay Parent in a Custody or Visitation Dispute: Battling the 
Overt and Insidious Bias of Experts and Judges, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 
75 (1996). 
197. Anne T. Payne, The Law and the Problem Parent: Custody and 
Parental Rights of Homosexual, Mentally Retarded, Mentally Ill and 
Incarcerated Parents, 16 J. Fam. L. 797, 818 (1977); see also, e.g., Ex 
parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Ex parte 
D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998)) (affirming custody change 
from mother to father due to mother’s lesbian relationship because 
mother had “chosen to expose the child continuously to a lifestyle that 
is ‘neither legal in this state, nor moral in the eyes of most of its 
citizens’”); Evans v. Evans, 185 Cal. App. 2d 566, 568 n.1, 572 (1960) 
(conditioning a former husband’s supervised visits with children on his 
moving out of the home he shared with his male partner, moving into 
his parent’s home, and obtaining ongoing psychiatric help and holding 
that his wife was not in contempt of custody order for moving children 
to another state with her new husband because she was “endeavoring to 
establish a normal home” for the children); S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 67 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (relying on speculation of potential harm offered by 
a court-appointed psychologist, despite no showing of harm when the 
case was decided, to reverse a mother’s custody award due to the 
possibility that her lesbianism may harm the child in the future); H. v. 
H., 157 A.2d 721, 726 (N.J. Super Ct. 1959) (finding that a wife’s 
homosexuality constituted extreme cruelty justifying divorce because 
“[a]dded to the insult of sexual disloyalty per se . . . is the natural 
revulsion arising from the knowledge . . . that the spouse’s betrayal 
takes the form of perversion”); In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 860–61 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (concluding that “the homosexual relationship 
admittedly carried on by the respondent mother and [mother’s lesbian 
partner] in the apartment where the infant child . . . resides, creates an 
improper environment for this child,” justifying custody change to 
father and limiting mother’s visitation with child to situations where no 
other homosexuals are present); In re Charles Mara, 150 N.Y.S.2d 524, 
525–26 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1956) (allowing wife who took in 
homosexual boarder to retain custody of children but placing children 
under court supervision to make sure children “are not subjected to any 
unwholesome or immoral influence” and further requiring psychiatric 
examination of children to determine whether such influence has already 
occurred); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981) 
(confirming that homosexuality is “a significant factor to be considered 
in determining the custody of children”); Roberts v. Roberts, 489 
N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the trial court 
abused its discretion by not imposing severe restrictions on a 
homosexual father’s visits with his three children and remanding the 
case with the suggestion that the only alternative may be “to terminate 
visitation until the children attain such an age that they will not be 
harmed or influenced by learning of their father’s homosexuality”); 
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the rights and opportunities afforded LGBT citizens in this county. 
After noting significant gains, Professor Rivera pondered whether “the 
glass may be half empty rather than half full.”198  
In short, volumes of cases attest to the judiciary’s willingness to 
embrace and affirm stereotypical characterizations of homosexuals as 
sexually perverted and psychologically unstable.199 These attitudinally 
driven decisions continued despite case-specific evidence explicitly 
 
M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982) (concluding that the 
trial court did not err by stripping lesbian mother of custody because 
her son might be harmed during his adolescent years when he has to 
reconcile conflicting views of homosexuality and morality espoused by 
his mother and by society); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 10 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (concluding that “[t]here are sufficient social, 
moral and legal distinctions between the traditional heterosexual family 
relationship and illicit homosexual relationship to raise the presumption 
of regularity in favor of the licit, when established, shifting to the illicit, 
the burden of disproving detriment to the children”); Commonwealth ex 
rel. Bachman v. Bradley, 91 A.2d 379, 381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952) 
(awarding a wife exclusive custody of a couple’s two children and 
allowing her to decide whether bisexual former husband would be 
allowed visitation, even though record showed that children were not 
exposed to husband’s sexuality or harmed by it and reasoning that “the 
absence of harmful influences in the past does not eliminate the 
probabilities of the future”); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) 
(holding that a homosexual “father’s continuous exposure of the child to 
his immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and improper 
custodian,” and further stating that the father’s “unfitness is manifested 
by his willingness to impose” on his children the social condemnation 
associated with homosexuality “in exchange for his own gratification”). 
In addition to domestic relations disputes, courts lessened the burden of 
proof for establishing harm due to homosexuality in other types of cases, 
including employment and immigration. See, e.g., Schlegel v. United 
States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (affirming legitimacy of 
plaintiff’s employment termination on rationale that a homosexual’s 
presence would undermine morale and efficiency of workplace because 
fellow employees know “that a homosexual act is immoral, indecent, 
lewd, and obscene”); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 
1340, 1345–46 (Wash. 1977) (affirming termination of a teacher despite 
twelve years of excellent evaluations because “[h]omosexuality is widely 
condemned as immoral and was so condemned as immoral during 
biblical times,” because teacher indicated no intent to change, and 
because he “made a voluntary choice for which he must be held morally 
responsible”).  
198. Rivera II, supra note 1, at 1187.  
199. See cases cited supra note 197; see also People v. Friede, 233 N.Y.S. 
565, 567 (Magis. Ct. 1929) (condemning the tragic tales of the same-sex 
couples described in The Well of Loneliness, Radclyffe Hall, The 
Well of Loneliness (1928), as obscene due to the “unnatural and 
depraved relationships portrayed” and the book’s alleged subtext of 
justifying “the right of a pervert to prey upon normal members of a 
community”). 
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contradicting the stereotypes of gay men and lesbians that judges 
willingly embraced.200 This judicial mindset is especially well 
documented in cases where same-sex couples sought recognition of 
and legal protection for their relationships. A trilogy of California 
cases illustrates judges’ traditional reluctance to acknowledge that 
homosexual relationships are based on anything other than sexual 
conduct.201 
In its groundbreaking decision in Marvin v. Marvin,202 the 
Supreme Court of California identified legal and equitable principles 
providing for the distribution of property acquired in nonmarital 
relationships.203 The court rejected the rationales used by the trial 
court and courts in other jurisdictions to deny recognition of 
nonmarital relationships including public policy favoring marriage, 
traditional moral norms, and analogies to prostitution.  
The heterosexual couple in Marvin had cohabitated for seven 
years. Marriage was impossible because one of the principals, actor 
Lee Marvin, remained married to another woman during part of the 
cohabitation. When Lee’s nonmarital relationship with Michelle failed, 
Michelle sued for half the value of Lee’s property and enforcement of 
his alleged promise of continued financial support in exchange for her 
promise to sacrifice her career and “devote her full time to 
defendant . . . as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook.”204 
California’s Supreme Court held “that a contract between 
nonmarital partners will be enforced unless expressly and inseparably 
based upon an illicit consideration of sexual services.”205 Even without 
a contract, the court declared that a nonmarital partner may be 
entitled to remuneration under implied contract, partnership or joint 
venture, and constructive or resulting trusts.206 “Finally,” the court 
concluded, “a nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit for 
the reasonable value of household services rendered less the reasonable 
 
200. The stereotype affirmation cases also reflect the courts’ uneasy 
relationship with science in general and the social sciences—including 
psychology in particular. See generally Becker, supra note 8, at 231–49 
(discussing the tension and interaction between science and the law, 
specifically with regard to discrimination against gay men and lesbians).  
201. This judicial reluctance has also been obvious in the courts of other 
states. See In re Sharon Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1991) (documenting the eight-year legal battle of Karen Thomson to 
become the legal guardian of her partner after her partner suffered 
irreversible brain damage in an automobile accident). 
202. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
203. Id. at 110. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 114. 
206. Id. at 122. 
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value of support received if he can show that he rendered services 
with the expectation of monetary reward.”207 
The broad equitable and legal relief Marvin announced was not 
expressly limited to heterosexual partners, but courts resisted its 
application to homosexual partners. In Jones v. Daly,208 for example, 
the plaintiff asserted facts striking similar to those asserted by 
Michelle Marvin. Plaintiff claimed that he gave up his career to 
“render his services as a lover, companion, homemaker, traveling 
companion, housekeeper and cook”209 in exchange for his partner’s 
express promise to “furnish financial support to plaintiff for the rest of 
his life.”210 Because Jones’s complaint referred to his role as Daly’s 
lover, the California appeals court held that his “allegations clearly 
show that plaintiff’s rendition of sexual services to Daly was an 
inseparable part of the consideration for the ‘cohabitors agreement,’ 
and indeed was the predominant consideration.”211 Applying Marvin’s 
rule that compensation cannot be received for sexual services, the 
court held that Jones could not prevail on any legal or equitable 
theory.212 
The Jones Court’s citation of the Marvin rule denying 
reimbursement for a partner’s sexual services is accurate. The court’s 
distinction between the sexual services provided by the respective 
plaintiffs in Marvin and Jones is not.  
Michelle Marvin’s sexual services to her heterosexual partner no 
doubt played an integral role in their heterosexual cohabitation 
agreement. She described the agreement as requiring the couple to act 
as “husband and wife,” a relationship commonly assumed to involve 
sex.213 Indeed, the Marvin court’s lengthy refutation of defendant’s 
argument that awarding the relief his partner requested was 
equivalent to rewarding prostitution acknowledges that sex was an 
integral component of the Marvin cohabitation agreement.214 Despite 
sex being a core component of the cohabitation agreement, the 
Marvin court found the sexual services aspect of the agreement 
severable and not an impediment to the relief the heterosexual 
cohabitating plaintiff sought. 
 
207. Id. at 122–23. 
208. 122 Cal. App. 3d 500 (1981). 
209. Id. at 505. 
210. Id. Plaintiff’s claims in Jones were asserted against his partner’s estate, 
but that does not change the nature of the claims per se.  
211. Id. at 508 (emphasis added). 
212. Id. at 511. 
213. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976). 
214. Id. at 112–16. 
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In contrast, the Jones Court’s conclusion that the homosexual 
cohabitating plaintiff’s sexual services were “the predominant 
consideration” for the Jones-Daly cohabitation agreement is not 
supported by any evidence other than allegations in Jones’s complaint 
that Jones was serving as a “lover, companion, homemaker, traveling 
companion, housekeeper and cook.”215 The court provided no 
explanation as to why the inclusion of “lover” outweighed all five 
other categories of services for which plaintiff sought compensation. 
The court also construed the word “cohabiting” in Jones’s complaint 
as “only” pertaining to sexual services, again without adequate 
explanation.216 The Jones Court further failed to explain why it 
ignored the Marvin mandate that “any severable portion of the 
contract supported by independent consideration will still be 
enforced.”217 As in Marvin, the Jones Court could have severed the 
sacrifice by plaintiff of his career and his services as companion, 
homemaker, traveling companion, housekeeper, and cook from sexual 
services and thus provided the relief sought.218  
Finally, after relying exclusively on Jones’s complaint to 
determine the relationship was all about sex, the Jones Court upheld 
the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s request to reframe his claims in an 
amended complaint.219 In an analysis that would fail any first-year 
civil procedure exam, the court held that it “would simply constitute 
an idle act” to allow plaintiff to amend because the complaint filed 
“shows on its face that the ‘cohabitors agreement’ is unenforceable.”220 
In contrast, the Marvin Court recognized the major flaws in Marvin’s 
complaint as the reason to allow her to amend her complaint and 
obtain a remedy for the non-sexual services she provided.221 
In short, the Jones Court’s selective reliance on the Marvin 
decision and its denial of plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint 
expose that opinion as a classic example of the attitudinal or realism 
schools of judicial decision making.  
Seven years later, another California court of appeal rejected the 
Jones Court’s view that homosexual partners who entered a 
cohabitation agreement were bargaining primarily for sexual services. 
Like the plaintiffs in Marvin and Jones, the plaintiff in Whorton v. 
 
215. Jones, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 508–09. 
216. Id. at 508. 
217. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 114 (emphasis added). 
218. Notably, some courts have indicated that severance would have been 
proper. See Bergen v. Wood, 14 Cal. App. 4th 854, 859 (1993) 
(concluding that Jones was “wrongly decided”).  
219. Jones, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 510–11. 
220. Id. at 511.  
221. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 123. 
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Dillingham222 claimed to have foregone educational and career 
opportunities and provided numerous services for his now-former 
partner in exchange for significant equity in his partner’s real estate 
holdings and a promise of financial support for life.223 Unlike the 
plaintiffs in Marvin and Jones, Whorton characterized the services he 
provided as businesslike rather than personal.  
More specifically, Whorton claimed that his “exclusive, full-time 
occupation was to be Dillingham’s chauffeur, bodyguard, social and 
business secretary, partner and counselor in real estate investments, 
and to appear on his behalf when requested.”224 Whorton also alleged 
he was obligated to “render labor, skills, and personal services for the 
benefit of Dillingham’s business and investment endeavors.”225 In 
addition, plaintiff claimed that he “was to be Dillingham’s constant 
companion, confidant, traveling and social companion, and lover.”226 
Finally, Whorton alleged that he and his partner had agreed “that 
any portion of the agreement found to be legally unenforceable was 
severable and the balance of the provisions would remain in full force 
and effect.”227  
Despite the artfully pleaded complaint, the trial court invoked the 
Jones rationale, dismissing the case because the sexual services 
Whorton provided were inseparable from his other contractual duties, 
thus rendering the entire contract unenforceable. In Whorton, the 
appellate court reversed: 
The services which plaintiff alleges he agreed to and did provide 
included being a chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary, and partner 
and counselor in real estate investments. If provided, these 
services are of monetary value, and the type for which one 
would expect to be compensated unless there is evidence of a 
contrary intent. Thus, they are properly characterized as 
consideration independent of the sexual aspect of the 
relationship. By way of comparison, such services as being a 
constant companion and confidant are not the type which are 
usually monetarily compensated nor considered to have a 
“value” for purposes of contract consideration, and, absent 
peculiar circumstances, would likely be considered so 
intertwined with the sexual relationship as to be inseparable.228 
 
222. 202 Cal. App. 3d 447 (1988). 
223. Id. at 450. 
224. Id.  
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id.  
228. Id. at 454. 
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This passage from Whorton appears to be a model of judicial 
independence because it applies the rules of Marvin to the complaint 
without regard for the sexual orientation of the parties. It also 
accurately recites the general contract rule that social niceties like 
companionship and maintaining confidence constitute insufficient 
consideration for a contract. But upon further inspection, fine cracks 
appear in the veneer of judicial independence. For example, Marvin 
recognized a number of equitable remedies in the cohabitating partner 
scenario. Whorton makes no mention of those. In addition, while 
providing companionship and serving as a confidant require that one 
person devote time and attention to one’s partner, it does not 
necessarily follow that such services are automatically intertwined 
with sex.  
Overall the Whorton decision moves much closer to the goal of 
judicial independence than the Jones case. But the Whorton court’s 
conflation of companionship and sex reflects the continuing and 
significant influence of judicial attitudes that homosexual 
relationships are almost exclusively about sex. This is a common 
theme throughout the history of LGBT rights cases.229  
III. Judicial Independence Shift in 
LGBT Marriage Cases 
The Supreme Court’s 2013 United States v. Windsor230 decision 
makes marriage cases an appropriate and timely lens through which 
to examine the ongoing shift in judicial decision-making models in 
cases involving LGBT litigants.   
229. See, e.g., J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) 
(quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1985)) (declaring in custody case that “the state has a substantial 
interest in viewing homosexuality as errant sexual behavior which 
threatens the social fabric”); In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 857 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1976) (declaring that “innocent bystanders or 
children . . . may be affected physically and emotionally by close contact 
with homosexual conduct of adults,” even though no evidence of sexual 
conduct was presented in that case); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 
10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1343–44 (Wash. 1977) (upholding a teacher’s 
dismissal for “immorality” because teacher “admitted his status as a 
homosexual,” from which the court concluded that “it is unquestioned 
that homosexual acts were participated in by him, although there was 
no evidence of any overt act having been committed”). See generally 
Nussbaum, supra note 8 (discussing the idea that much legal 
discrimination against gays and lesbians is motivated by disgust); 
Christopher Carnahan, Inscribing Lesbian and Gay Identities: How 
Judicial Imaginations Intertwine with the Best Interests of Children, 11 
Cardozo Women’s L.J. 1 (2004) (discussing the need to both protect 
the interests of children and avoid negatively treating homosexuals in 
the law). 
230. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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A. The Long Shadow of Baker v. Nelson 
Baker v. Nelson231 is commonly acknowledged as the first reported 
case challenging the heterosexual exclusivity of marriage. Richard 
John Baker and James Michael McConnell argued that Minnesota’s 
rejection of their marriage license application violated state and 
federal constitutional provisions, including the due process and equal 
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.232 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court summarized plaintiffs’ arguments as an 
“assertion that the right to marry without regard to the sex of the 
parties is a fundamental right of all persons and that restricting 
marriage to only couples of the opposite sex is irrational and 
invidiously discriminatory.”233  
Minnesota’s highest court readily acknowledged the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s characterization of marriage as a “basic civil right” that is 
“fundamental to our very existence and survival,”234 and that 
constitutional guarantees of privacy surround the marriage 
relationship.235 But the court found no reason to extend these bedrock 
constitutional principles to a couple of the same sex.  
To the contrary, the Baker Court concluded that “[t]he 
institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely 
involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as 
old as the book of Genesis.”236 The court found neither contemporary 
concepts of marriage nor societal interests as justification for 
modifying its Bible-based paradigm of marriage, concluding that 
“[t]he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a 
charter for restructuring it by judicial legislation.”237  
The Baker Court was unwavering in its reliance on procreation 
and child rearing as its primary rationale for reserving marriage 
exclusively for opposite sex couples, even though, as plaintiffs pointed 
out, some married couples never procreate or raise children. “[T]he 
classification is no more than theoretically imperfect,” the court 
reasoned, further explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not demand “abstract symmetry.”238 
 
231. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
232. Id. at 186.  
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 187 (citations omitted) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967)).  
235. Id. at 186 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)). 
236. Id. at 186. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 187. 
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Minnesota’s Supreme Court expressed an equally firm conviction 
that Loving v. Virginia,239 the U.S. Supreme Court decision that 
declared antimiscegenation statutes contrary to Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection guarantees, had no relevance to same-
sex marriage.240 The Baker court characterized racial discrimination as 
“directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,”241 and concluded that “in commonsense and 
in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital 
restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the 
fundamental difference in sex.”242 
The same-sex partners in Baker sought U.S. Supreme Court 
review on the grounds that Minnesota’s denial of their marriage 
license violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
fundamental right to marry, constituted gender discrimination in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, and 
denied their privacy rights grounded in the Ninth Amendment.243 The 
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the appeal in a one-sentence order, 
stating that the appeal was “dismissed for want of a substantial 
federal question.”244 
McConnell, one of the Baker plaintiffs, was subsequently denied 
employment with the University of Minnesota for seeking a marriage 
license. The federal district court analogized McConnell’s treatment 
by the university to the witch hunts of homosexuals exercised during 
the McCarthy era and concluded that such discriminatory treatment 
 
239. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
240. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
241. Id. (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12). 
242. Id. at 187. 
243. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants at 3, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 
810 (1972) (No. 71-1027). 
244. Baker, 409 U.S. at 810. Because this case was before the Court pursuant 
to a mandatory appeal, the precedential value of its dismissal has 
engendered significant debate. See Note, Developments in the Law: The 
Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1274 (1980) 
(discussing whether Baker’s dismissal established that no federal 
constitutional rights are implicated in a state’s denial of same-sex 
marriage). Compare Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1305 (M.D. 
Fla. 2005) (finding that Baker does preclude federal constitutional 
challenges to state laws banning same-sex marriage), with In re Kandu, 
315 B.R. 123, 138 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (concluding Baker is no 
longer controlling in challenges to state same-sex marriage bans due to 
subsequent Supreme Court opinions on equal protection grounds). The 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013), does not fully resolve the continuing relevance of Baker because 
it was based on a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge to a 
federal law prohibiting same-sex marriage. 
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violated McConnell’s liberty and property interests under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.245 In McConnell v. Anderson,246 the Eighth 
Circuit reversed, holding that a state university’s decision not to hire 
McConnell due to his homosexuality did not constitute the “arbitrary, 
unreasonable or capricious” level of conduct required for courts to 
intervene.247 The court held: 
[I]t is at once apparent that this is not a case involving mere 
homosexual propensities on the part of a prospective employee. 
Neither is it a case in which an applicant is excluded from 
employment because of a desire clandestinely to pursue 
homosexual conduct. It is, instead, a case in which something 
more than remunerative employment is sought; a case in which 
the applicant seeks employment on his own terms; a case in 
which the prospective employee demands, as shown both by the 
allegations of the complaint and by the marriage license incident 
as well, the right to pursue an activist role in implementing his 
unconventional ideas concerning the societal status to be 
accorded homosexuals and, thereby, to foist tacit approval of 
this socially repugnant concept upon his employer, who is, in 
this instance, an institution of higher learning. We know of no 
constitutional fiat or binding principle of decisional law which 
requires an employer to accede to such extravagant demands.248 
In short, Baker and McConnell characterized a same-sex couple’s 
request to marry as a “socially repugnant” and “extravagant 
demand.”249 Other judges embraced this perspective.250 What cannot 
be measured, of course, is the profound effect the Baker and 
McDonnell decisions had in discouraging lesbian and gay activists 
from pursuing marriage equality litigation for decades after those 
cases were decided.  
 
245. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 814–15 (D. Minn. 1970).  
246. 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971). 
247. Id. at 196. 
248. Id. at 196. The Eighth Circuit also summarily rejected McConnell’s 
argument that the University’s decision violated his First Amendment 
right to speak on issues of political and social concern. Id. at 196 n.7. 
249. Id. at 196. 
250. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Jones 
v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 
P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). As in the Nelson case, one of the 
Singer plaintiffs was subject to employment discrimination for seeking a 
marriage license with his same-sex partner. Singer v. U.S. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n, 530 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 
429 U.S. 1034 (1977). 
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More recently, the Supreme Court’s recognition of the federal 
constitutional rights of gay men and lesbians in cases such as Romer 
v. Evans251 and Lawrence v. Texas252 led federal courts to question 
Baker’s apparent bar to federal constitutional marriage equality 
claims.253 But Baker’s continued impact, if any, will not be fully 
resolved until the Supreme Court resolves a Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection challenge to a state’s denial of a same-sex couple’s 
right to marry.254  
B. Pro-Equality State Decisions Prior to Windsor and Perry 
1. Hawaii’s Saga: Baehr v. Lewin  
The Hawaii case of Baehr v. Lewin255 represents the first 
significant victory for marriage equality advocates, albeit a short-lived 
one. Baehr offers a classic example of judicial independence due to the 
trial court’s: 1) full consideration of the extensive evidence plaintiffs 
adduced to dismantle negative stereotypes about same-sex couples 
and their parenting abilities; and 2) appropriate application of 
established legal doctrine to that largely uncontroverted evidence.  
Three same-sex couples denied marriage licenses alleged in Baehr 
that the state’s rejection of their marriage applications violated 
Hawaii’s constitutional guarantees of privacy, equal protection, and 
due process. On October 1, 1991, the Baehr trial court dismissed the 
 
251. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (concluding that a state constitutional amendment 
denying gay and lesbian citizens opportunity to seek anti-discrimination 
protection via local and state law violated Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection guarantees under rational basis analysis).  
252. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring state sodomy laws unconstitutional due 
to violation of federal constitutional privacy rights of gay men and 
lesbians).  
253. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012) (concluding that “Baker does not resolve our 
own case but it does limit the arguments to ones that do not presume or 
rest on a constitutional right to same-sex marriage”), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 2884 (2013); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 
294, 307–09, 333 n.9 (D. Conn. 2012) (distinguishing the federal 
constitutional issues in Baker as related to challenges to state law 
banning marriage compared to federal law at issue in DOMA and 
stating that “[a]rguably, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in 
Romer and Lawrence reflect doctrinal developments that suggest the 
Supreme Court would no longer consider the federal question in Baker 
to be unsubstantial and therefore binding on lower courts”). 
254. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013), may telegraph the Court’s view that denial of marriage equality 
violates Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees, but 
Windsor was resolved on Fifth Amendment equal protection grounds. 
Accordingly it does not fully repudiate Baker. 
255. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  
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couples’ complaint for failure to state a claim prior to any evidence 
being submitted in the case.256 Hawaii’s Supreme Court reversed, 
declaring the trial court’s dismissal inappropriate because the trial 
court had made factual findings and rendered conclusions of law 
instead of limiting its analysis to the face of the complaint.257 Rather 
than merely remanding to the trial court, the court provided a 
detailed analysis of same-sex marriage under the Hawaii Constitution.  
In its plurality decision, Hawaii’s highest court found no 
fundamental right to marriage “arising out of the right to privacy or 
otherwise.”258 Two of the four justices, however, held that denial of 
marriage licenses to persons of the same sex implicated Hawaii’s 
explicit constitutional guarantee of equal protection based on sex, 
thus requiring strict scrutiny of the state’s reasons for that denial.259 
These two justices deemed the denial presumptively unconstitutional, 
requiring the state to prove “compelling state interests” for excluding 
same-sex couples from marrying and to demonstrate that “the statute 
is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of the applicant 
couples’ constitutional rights.”260 The concurring judge also foresaw a 
possible equal protection claim based on sex, but only if plaintiffs 
could show that “heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and 
asexuality are ‘biologically fated.’”261  
At trial after remand,262 the state attempted to satisfy strict 
scrutiny by asserting compelling state interests in: (1) promoting “the 
optimal development of children,” further urging that “all things 
being equal, it is best for a child that it be raised in a single home by 
its parents, or at least by a married male and female”; (2) “securing 
or assuring recognition of Hawaii marriages in other jurisdictions”; 
and (3) “protecting the public fisc from the reasonably foreseeable 
effects of approval of same-sex marriage.”263 Because the state 
provided minimal (and ultimately unpersuasive) evidence on the 
latter two points,264 the optimal environment for child-rearing became 
the determinative issue. 
 
256. Id. at 53. 
257. Id. at 54. 
258. Id. at 57. 
259. Id. at 67. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 69–70 (Burns, J., concurring). 
262. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 
1996). 
263. Id. at *3. 
264. The dearth of evidence presented by the state on the financial 
ramifications of marriage equality and possible conflict of laws issues is 
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Defendants proffered the testimony of four expert witnesses to 
support the state’s claimed interests in limiting marriage to opposite-
sex couples. One defense expert claiming psychology credentials was 
disqualified from testifying about alleged methodological flaws in 
social science studies on same-sex families due to his belief that all 
“modern psychology is so flawed that no fix, reconciliation or 
overhaul can correct it.”265 The other three defense experts provided 
significant support for plaintiffs’ arguments that no compelling 
rationale exists for treating same-sex couples differently than their 
heterosexual counterparts.  
Defense experts tried to stress the importance of having both a 
mother and a father to a child’s development, but they readily 
conceded that gay and lesbian parents can and do make excellent 
parents. Based on research and his own clinical experience, for 
example, child psychiatrist Dr. Kyle Pruett conceded that “the 
beneficial results described above are not essential to being a happy, 
healthy and well-adjusted child”;266 “in general, gay and lesbian 
parents are as fit and loving parents as non-gay persons and 
couples”;267 “same-sex couples should be allowed to adopt children, 
provide foster care and to take children in and raise and care for 
them”;268 and “the quality of the nurturing relationship between 
parent and child could, and would, outweigh any limitation or burden 
imposed on the child as a result of having same-sex parents.”269 
Defense experts also agreed that children of same-sex couples would 
greatly benefit from the legal and social benefits associated with their 
parents’ marriages.270  
Based on their extensive clinical experience and academic studies 
of families headed by same-sex couples, plaintiffs’ four experts 
confirmed that same-sex couples provide excellent environments for 
 
addressed in the trial court’s “Specific Findings” (¶¶ 117, 118) and 
“Conclusions of Law” (¶¶ 12, 13). Id. at *16, 19–20. 
265. Id. at *8 (excluding testimony of Dr. Richard Williams). 
266. Id. at *4. Defense expert and sociologist Dr. David Eggebeen also 
conceded that “same-sex couples can create stable family environments 
and raise healthy and well-adjusted children.” Id. at *7. 
267. Id. at *5. Defense expert and psychologist Dr. Thomas Merrill similarly 
stated that “that the sexual orientation of a parent is not an indication 
of parental fitness” and that “gay and lesbian couples with children do 
have successful relationships.” Id. at *10. 
268. Id. at *5. Defense expert Dr. David Eggebeen similarly acknowledged 
that gay and lesbian parents “should be allowed to adopt children and 
serve as foster parents.” Id. at *8. 
269. Id. at *5. 
270. Id. at *8 (relating the testimony of defense expert Dr. David Eggebeen); 
id. at *10 (relating the testimony of defense expert Dr. Thomas Merrill).  
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their children.271 One of plaintiffs’ experts, pediatrician Dr. Robert 
Bidwell, admitted that children of nontraditional families may 
experience some discomfort from being different, but explained that 
such discomfort will not necessarily harm the child. All children wish 
on occasion for their parents to be different, Dr. Bidwell explained, 
but that “doesn’t do developmental damage to these kids.”272 “If 
anything, it creates strength and promotes growth.”273 
Based on the virtually undisputed evidence that same-sex couples 
are effective parents and that both parents and children would benefit 
greatly from state recognition and support of their families, the court 
found no compelling state reason justifying the state’s denial of 
marriage to them.274 Following extensive findings of fact, the Baehr 
trial court summarized its evidentiary conclusion. “Simply put,” the 
court explained, “Defendant has failed to establish or prove that the 
public interest in the well-being of children and families, or the 
optimal development of children will be adversely affected by same-
sex marriage.”275 
In this classic exercise of judicial independence, the Baehr trial 
court then applied established Hawaiian constitutional law principles 
to its well-documented findings of fact. Although marriage was not 
recognized as a fundamental right in Hawaii,276 plaintiffs had a viable 
constitutional challenge grounded in the state’s constitutional 
 
271. Id. at *10–16. Plaintiffs experts were: (1) sociologist Dr. Pepper 
Schwartz, described by the court as “an expert in sociology and 
interdisciplinary studies of sexuality with a special expertise in gender 
and human sexuality, marriage and the family, and same-sex relations in 
parenting and research”; (2) Dr. Charlotte Patterson, a University of 
Virginia professor specializing in the “psychology of child development 
with a special expertise in lesbian and gay parenting and the 
development of children of lesbian and gay parents”; (3) Dr. David 
Brodzinsky, a clinical psychologist with an academic appointment at 
Rutgers University with expertise in “adoption and other forms of 
nonbiological parenting and the development of children raised by 
nonbiological parents”; and (4) Dr. Robert Bidwell, a pediatrician with 
a subspecialty in adolescent medicine who “teaches medical students 
and pediatric residents in training, provides patient care, and practices 
adolescent medicine and general pediatrics at Kapiolani Medical 
Center.” Id. at *11–15. 
272. Id. at *16. 
273. Id. 
274. The court also found that the state had failed to provide sufficient 
evidence of damage to the state’s fisc or adverse harm to Hawaii if other 
states failed to recognize Hawaii’s same-sex marriage couples. Id. at *16. 
275. Id. at *18. 
276. Id. at *19. Hawaiian marriage is a “legal status which gives rise to 
certain rights and benefits” rather than a fundamental right. Id. 
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guarantee against sex-based discrimination.277 The evidentiary record 
unequivocally demonstrated that the state had not met its burden 
under strict scrutiny to demonstrate “compelling state interests” for 
the denial or to show that the statutory exclusion had been “narrowly 
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights.”278 
The trial court concluded: 
Defendant has failed to present sufficient credible evidence 
which demonstrates that the public interest in the well-being of 
children and families, or the optimal development of children 
would be adversely affected by same-sex marriage. Nor has 
Defendant demonstrated how same-sex marriage would 
adversely affect the public fisc, the state interest in assuring 
recognition of Hawaii marriages in other states, the institution 
of traditional marriage, or any other important public or 
governmental interest.279 
The Baehr litigation stands both as a model of judicial independence 
and as a testament to the need for an independent judiciary to 
counter the majoritarian trampling of minority rights. This landmark 
case created a firestorm of backlash, fueling the passage of the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 and this amendment to the Hawaiian 
Constitution: “The legislature shall have the power to reserve 
marriage to opposite-sex couples.”280 As the Supreme Court of Hawaii 
explained, the amendment validated the statute struck down by the 
trial court “by taking the statute out of the ambit of the equal 
protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution, at least insofar as the 
statute, both on its face and as applied, purported to limit access to 
the marital status to opposite-sex couples.”281  
277. Id. at *19. 
278. Id. at *19. 
279. Id. at *21. The court also rejected the argument that allowing same-sex 
couples to marry will lead inevitably to legalization of incest, polygamy, 
and prostitution because that argument “disregards existing statutes 
and established precedent” and overlooks the language in the Hawaiian 
Supreme Court’s decision remanding this case which acknowledged 
“compelling reasons to prevent and prohibit marriage under 
circumstances such as incest.” Id. at *20 (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44, 59 n.19 (Haw. 1993)). 
280. Haw. Const. art I, § 23. The amendment was passed by Hawaii’s 
House and Senate in 1997 and ratified by voters in 1998. Id. 
281. Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *6 (Haw. 1999). 
More than two decades after the Baehr litigation began, the battle for 
marriage equality in Hawaii appeared to end on November 13, 2013, 
with the governor’s signature of legislation extending marriage to same-
sex couples. See Doug Mataconis, Hawaii About to Legalize Same-Sex 
Marriage: What a Difference 20 Years Makes, Outside the Beltway 
(Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/hawaii-about-to-lega
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2. Massachusetts, California, and Iowa Equality Decisions 
In the two decades following the Hawaii Supreme Court’s initial 
Baehr decision, marriage equality advocates experienced significant 
victories and stunning setbacks. The majority of setbacks were 
delivered not by judges but by legislators and voters who locked 
marriage inequality into state constitutions and federal statutes.282 
Many state constitutional amendments extended beyond marriage 
bans to preclude any form of relationship recognition for same-sex 
couples, including comprehensive domestic partnerships and  
civil unions.283  
In sharp contrast, some judges demonstrated their commitment to 
judicial independence by being receptive to the legal and factual 
arguments advanced for marriage equality. As a result of the 
“uncommon portion of fortitude”284 exhibited by these judges,  
lize-same-sex-marriage-what-a-difference-20-years-makes/ (providing a 
succinct explanation of national and state consequences of Hawaii’s 1993 
Baehr decision). Because Hawaii’s constitution empowers the state 
legislature to revoke the right of same-sex couples to marry, same-sex 
couples are pursuing litigation alleging that the federal constitution 
prohibits the state legislature from ever reversing its current marriage 
equality stance. The plaintiffs prevailed at the trial level. See Jackson v. 
Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Hawaii 2012). As of September 
2014, the case was pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Updates on Jackson and on all marriage equality cases pending in the 
United States are available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/pending-
marriage-equality-cases. 
282. As of December 2013, twenty states had constitutional amendments 
prohibiting same-sex marriage and other forms of relationship 
recognition: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Where State Laws Stand, Freedom to 
Marry, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/where-state-laws-stand 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2014) [hereinafter State Laws]. The constitutional 
amendments in nine states only prohibit marriage by same-sex couples 
but do not outlaw other forms of relationship recognition: Alaska, 
Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, 
and Tennessee. Four states—Indiana, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and 
Wyoming—have statutes limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples but 
no constitutional bans. Id. As of September 1996, the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) barred the federal government from recognizing 
same-sex marriages for the purpose of federal laws, obligations, and 
benefits and provided that no state had to recognize marriages of same-
sex couples legally performed in other states. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) 
(governing federal law), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) (applicable to states). 
283. State Laws, supra note 282.  
284. This term is employed by Alexander Hamilton when articulating the 
need for independent judiciary to safeguard minority rights. The 
Federalist No. 78, supra note 16, at 509 (Alexander Hamilton). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence  
915 
marriage equality became a reality in Massachusetts,285 California,286 
Connecticut,287 and Iowa.288 Each case featured an evidentiary record 
similar to the record established in the Baehr litigation applied to 
equal protection and other rights established by state constitutions. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa’s unanimous decision in Varnum v. 
O’Brien289 is illustrative of these courts’ application of the rule of law 
to the credible evidence of record.  
Evidence proffered in Varnum including the following:  
The twelve plaintiffs are, “[l]ike most 
Iowans, . . . responsible, caring, and productive individuals” 
who “are contributing, benevolent members of their 
communities.” 290 
“Like many Iowans, some have children and others hope 
to have children.”291 
“Despite the commonality shared with other Iowans, the 
twelve plaintiffs are different from most in one way. They 
are sexually and romantically attracted to members of their 
own sex.”292 
Plaintiffs’ exclusion from the rights, benefits, and 
responsibilities associated with marriage places them at a 
distinct disadvantage compared to their heterosexual 
counterparts including “the ultimate disadvantage” of “the 
inability to obtain for themselves and for their children the 
personal and public affirmation that accompanies 
marriage.”293 
 
285. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948–49 (Mass. 
2003). 
286. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
287. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
288. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 872. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. The court also rejected the state’s argument that same-sex couples 
are not “similarly situated” to heterosexual couples because evidence 
unequivocally established that “for purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, 
which are designed to bring a sense of order to the legal relationships of 
committed couples and their families in myriad ways, plaintiffs are 
similarly situated in every important respect, but for their sexual 
orientation.” Id. at 883–84. 
293. Id. at 873. 
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Plaintiffs’ argument that “same-sex couples can raise 
children as well as opposite-sex couples” is confirmed by 
“the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American 
Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological 
Association, the National Association of Social Workers, 
and the Child Welfare League of America.”294 
 
The well-established state constitutional and other legal principles 
identified in Varnum included the following:  
Like the U.S. Constitution, the Iowa Constitution has a 
blueprint for government that establishes “three separate, 
but equal, branches of government and delineates the 
limited roles and powers of each branch.”295 
The Iowa Supreme Court “has the responsibility to 
determine if the law enacted by the legislative branch and 
enforced by the executive branch violates the Iowa 
Constitution.”296 
“A statute inconsistent with the Iowa Constitution must 
be declared void, even though it may be supported by 
strong and deep seated traditional beliefs and popular 
opinion.”297 
“The framers of the Iowa Constitution knew, as did the 
drafters of the United States Constitution, that ‘times can 
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that 
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress.’”298 
“The primary constitutional principle at the heart of this 
case is the doctrine of equal protection,” a concept that 
history reveals as “often expressed far more easily than it is 
practiced.”299 
“Like the Federal Equal Protection Clause found in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
Iowa’s constitutional promise of equal protection ‘is 
 
294. Id. at 873–74. 
295. Id. at 875. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 876 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003)). 
299. Id. at 876–77. 
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essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike.’”300 
In deference to the legislature, a presumption exists that 
the marriage statute is constitutional and plaintiffs bear 
“the heavy burden” of negating “every reasonable basis 
upon which the classification may be sustained.”301  
Based on the general guidance provided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court for identifying the appropriate level of equal 
protection scrutiny, the more specific analyses provided in 
state court decisions resolving marriage equality claims, and 
Iowa precedent, Iowa’s exclusions of same-sex couples from 
marriage may be subject to strict scrutiny analysis.302 
However, application of that standard is not necessary 
because the exclusion cannot even satisfy intermediate 
scrutiny.303 
“‘To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory class-
ification must be substantially related to an important 
governmental objective.’”304 
Applying these legal principles to the evidentiary record before it, the 
Varnum Court unanimously concluded that preservation of tradition 
is not an adequate state interest to deny marriage to same-sex 
couples. “If a simple showing that discrimination is traditional 
satisfies equal protection,” the court reasoned, “previous successful 
equal protection challenges of invidious racial and gender 
classifications would have failed.”305 
While acknowledging that promoting children’s best interests is 
an important governmental objective, the court also found “an 
abundance of evidence and research” supporting “the proposition that 
the interests of children are served equally by same-sex parents and 
opposite-sex parents.”306 Similarly, while the state has a valid interest  
300. Id. at 878 (citation omitted) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). 
301. Id. at 879 (citation omitted). 
302. Id. at 885–97. 
303. Id. at 896. 
304. Id. (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).  
305. Id. at 898.  
306. Id. at 899. The Court further observed that banning only same-sex 
marriages is under-inclusive in promoting optimal child rearing because 
the statute does not ban marriages of those who have a record of bad 
parenting and over-inclusive because it bans marriage of same-sex 
couples who do not intend to have children. Id. at 899–901. “In the 
end,” the Varnum court concluded, “a careful analysis of the over- and 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence  
918 
in procreation to ensure “the continuation of the human race,”307 
“[g]ay and lesbian persons are capable of procreation,”308 and 
heterosexual couples who “do not procreate for reasons such as age, 
physical disability, or choice”309 are not precluded from marrying.  
The Varnum court recognized promotion of stable opposite-sex 
relationships through marriage as an important government 
objective, but found no proof that excluding gay and lesbian couples 
from marriage stabilized their heterosexual counterparts.310 Similarly, 
conservation of state resources proved insufficient grounds for the 
challenged marriage exclusion because exclusion of “any group from 
civil marriage—African-Americans, illegitimates, aliens, even red-
haired individuals—would conserve state resources in an equally 
‘rational’way.”311 In addition, excluding Iowa’s approximately 5,800 
couples from same-sex marriage would be both underinclusive because 
“conservation of state resources would be equally served by excluding 
any similar-sized group”312 and overinclusive “because many same-
sex couples, if allowed to marry, would not use more state resources 
than they currently consume as unmarried couples.”313  
“Our equal protection clause requires more than has been offered 
to justify the continued existence of the same-sex marriage ban under 
the statute,”314 the Varnum court concluded. “To decide otherwise 
would be an abdication of our constitutional duty.”315  
While state constitutional law compelled Hawaii’s Baehr court to 
apply strict scrutiny and Iowa’s Varnum Court to employ 
intermediate scrutiny316 to test the constitutionality of excluding 
 
under-inclusiveness of the statute reveals it is less about using marriage 
to achieve an optimal environment for children and more about merely 
precluding gay and lesbian people from civil marriage.” Id. at 901. 
307. Id. at 901. 
308. Id. at 902. 
309. Id.  
310. Id.  
311. Id. at 903. 
312. Id.  
313. Id. 
314. Id. at 904. 
315. Id. at 906; see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 
412, 481 (Conn. 2008) (explaining the judiciary’s duty to ascertain the 
constitutionality of legislative enactments and concluding that “we do 
not exceed our authority by mandating equal treatment for gay persons; 
in fact, any other action would be an abdication of our responsibility”). 
316. Connecticut’s Supreme Court also applied intermediate scrutiny to 
strike down that state’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage. 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412, 480. 
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same-sex couples from marriage, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,317 
evaluated plaintiffs’ equal protection claims under the rational basis 
test.318 To survive rationale basis scrutiny, the state only had to 
convince the court that “an impartial lawmaker could logically believe 
that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that 
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.”319 
Even under that highly deferential test, Goodridge held that the 
state’s purported rationales of promoting procreation, providing an 
optimal environment for children, and conserving state resources fell 
far short of justifying marriage inequality.320 The Goodridge Court 
concluded: 
The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality 
of all individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens. 
In reaching our conclusion we have given full deference to the 
arguments made by the Commonwealth. But it has failed to 
identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil 
marriage to same-sex couples.321 
The foregoing explications of Baehr, Varnum, and Goodridge 
demonstrate that each court applied well-established legal principles 
to an extensive record of highly credible evidence to reject antiquated 
rationales for excluding same-sex couples from secular marriage. In so 
doing, the judges often addressed factors external to the law and facts 
that had previously influenced judicial decision making in cases 
involving LGBT litigants, including religion, the judge’s personal 
sense of morality, and public opinion.  
The Varnum court, for example, acknowledged that “[w]hether 
expressly or impliedly, much of society rejects same-sex marriage due 
to sincere, deeply ingrained—even fundamental—religious belief.”322 
The court also observed that “other equally sincere groups and people 
in Iowa and around the nation have strong religious views that yield 
the opposite conclusion.”323 Reiterating that the Iowa Constitution’s 
Establishment Clause expressly prohibits the courts from resolving 
such religious disputes, the court explained that its determination of  
317. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
318. Id. at 961. 
319. Id. at 960 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432, 452 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing English 
v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 333 (1989)).  
320.  Id. at 961–65. 
321. Id. at 948. 
322. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 904 (Iowa 2009). 
323. Id. at 905. 
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the “class of persons entitled to secular rights and benefits associated 
with civil marriage”324 had no impact on the power of religious 
denominations to continue to “define marriage as a union between a 
man and a woman.”325 
Even though the state had not asserted religious liberty as a 
justification for denying marriage to same-sex couples, the California 
Supreme Court raised and then rejected the possibility that the 
constitutional rights of citizens whose religious views preclude 
acceptance of homosexuality would be infringed by that court’s 
marriage equality decision. “[N]o religion will be required to change its 
religious policies or practices with regard to same-sex couples,” the 
court explained, “and no religious officiant will be required to 
solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs.”326 
Goodridge similarly recognized that religion and other influences 
that commonly shape public opinion should not sway the court. In the 
second paragraph of its very lengthy opinion, the court acknowledged 
that many people hold deep-seated “religious, moral, and ethical 
convictions” regarding marriage equality, thus resulting in deep 
sociological and political divides on the issue.327 The court rejected the 
possibility that public policy favoring or condemning marriage 
equality should shape its opinion, clarifying that its “concern is with 
the Massachusetts Constitution as a charter of governance for every 
person properly within its reach,”328 further declaring that “[o]ur 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own 
moral code.”329 
Based on application of the rule of law to the evidence presented 
and rejection of constitutionally irrelevant but potentially powerful 
external factors, these marriage equality decisions model the type of 
judicial independence to which judges should aspire. Rendering these 
decisions required significant courage, and three of the seven judges in 
Varnum were rewarded for their independence by being ousted from 
 
324. Id.; see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954 (reporting that “[i]n 
Massachusetts, civil marriage is, and since pre-Colonial days has been, 
precisely what its name implies: a wholly secular institution”). 
325. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 906. 
326. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451 (Cal. 2008) (citing Cal. 
Const. art. I, § 4). The California Constitution states that “[f]ree 
exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference 
are guaranteed” and that laws “respecting an establishment of religion” 
are prohibited. Cal. Const., art. I, § 4. 
327. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.  
328. Id. 
329. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)).  
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office in a retention election.330 Still, former Iowa Supreme Court 
Justice Marcus Ternus would not have compromised her 
constitutional duty to recognize marriage equality in exchange for 
success at the ballot box. True independence requires a “judiciary 
that is committed to the rule of law, independent of—free of—outside 
influence, including personal bias or preference,”331 Justice Ternus 
explained. “Only an independent judiciary can ensure that the 
minority is protected from the tyranny of the majority.”332  
2. Lower Federal Court DOMA Decisions Prior to Windsor 
The inequities codified by section 3 of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act333 (DOMA) became increasingly clear as more states 
embraced marriage equality.334 Continued enforcement of DOMA’s bar 
to federal rights and benefits for same-sex married couples created 
two distinct marital classes. Opposite-sex couples continued to enjoy a 
privileged status accompanied by all the legal rights and benefits 
associated with marriage at both the state and federal levels.335 Same-
sex married couples were relegated to a second-tier status limited to 
state rights and benefits. DOMA’s codification of this unequal status 
was declared unconstitutional in nine federal court decisions rendered 
between July 2010 and October 2012.336 The glaring inequality 
 
330. The campaign expressly targeted Chief Justice Marsha Ternus, Justice 
Michael Streit, and Justice David Baker based on their Varnum decision 
and was funded extensively by out-of-state funds from anti-equality 
groups. Curriden, supra note 154, at 56; A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of 
Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bush, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2010, at A1; see 
also Pettys, supra note 154 (presenting a comprehensive review of the 
judge’s retention battle). 
331. Ternus, supra note 10, at 480. 
332. Id. at 487. 
333. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
334. DOMA mandates that “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of 
Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 
‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
335. There are 1,138 federal statutory provisions “in which marital status is a 
factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and privileges.” Letter 
from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, to Bill 
First, U.S. Senate Majority Leader (Jan. 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/search?q=GAO-04-353R (further detailing the 
specific provisions of the code that DOMA affects). 
336. The nine decisions consist of one bankruptcy court decision, six district 
court decisions, and two circuit court decisions. The First Circuit’s 
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occasioned by DOMA also resulted in the Department of Justice’s 
decision to no longer defend the legislation against constitutional 
attack.337 As a result, the U.S. House of Representatives’ Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Committee (BLAG) intervened to defend DOMA in 
numerous ongoing cases.338  
 
 Case Judge Appointing President 
Golinski v. U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management339 
Jeffrey White George W. Bush 
Pedersen v. Office of 
Personnel Management340 
Vanessa Bryant George W. Bush 
Dragovich v. U.S. Department 
of Treasury341 
Claudia Wilkin William J. Clinton 
 
decision affirmed two cases brought on distinct grounds. See infra notes 
339–351, accompanying text, and Table 2. 
337. In February 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the 
Department of Justice would no longer defend DOMA’s 
constitutionality because the Attorney General and President Obama 
had concluded that heightened scrutiny should apply to sexual 
orientation classifications and that DOMA’s prohibition of federal 
recognition of same-sex couples’ marriages is unconstitutional under that 
standard. The executive branch would, however, continue to enforce 
DOMA. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. 
Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, at 5 (Feb. 23, 
2011) [hereinafter Holder letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.  
338. On March 9, 2011, the U.S. House of Representative’s Bipartisan 
Leadership Advisory Group (BLAG) voted 3–2, along party lines, to 
direct the House General Counsel to defend DOMA in court. Press 
Release, John Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
House Will Ensure DOMA Constitutionality is Determined by the Court 
(Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://boehner.house.gov/news/documentsin
gle.aspx?DocumentID=228585. After hiring former Solicitor General 
Paul Clement as lead counsel, BLAG successfully sought intervention in 
pending federal cases to defend DOMA’s bar of federal recognition of 
same-sex couples’ marriages. See Matthew I. Hall, How Congress Could 
Defend DOMA in Court (and Why the BLAG Cannot), 65 Stan. L. 
Rev. Online 92, 93–94 (2013) (explaining BLAG’s involvement in 
DOMA defense). 
339. 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that strict scrutiny is 
the appropriate level of review and that DOMA is unconstitutional 
under that standard and under rational basis review). 
340. 881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012) (finding that legislation 
disadvantaging federal employees, their same-sex spouses, and their 
children should be subject to strict scrutiny, but applying rational basis 
because: (1) the U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized a higher 
standard; and (2) rationales offered to defend DOMA intent do not even 
satisfy the lowly rational basis standards). 
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In re Balas342 Eighteen Unanimous 
Bankruptcy Judges 
(various) 
Gill v. Office of Personnel 
Management343 
Joseph L. Tauro Richard M. Nixon 
Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Department of Health and 
Human Services344 
Joseph L. Tauro Richard M. Nixon 
Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Department of Health and 
Human Services345 (on appeal 
at the First Circuit) 
Michael Boudin346 George H.W. Bush347 
Sandra Lee Lynch William J. Clinton 
Juan R. Torruella Gerald R. Ford348 and 
Ronald W. Reagan349  
Windsor v. United States350 Barbara S. Jones William J. Clinton 
 
341. 872 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (applying rational basis test to 
determine that DOMA violates plaintiffs’ equal protection guarantee by 
precluding same-sex married couples from participating in California 
state employees’ long-term care insurance program maintained under 
federal law). 
342.  449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding in a unanimous 
decision of twenty bankruptcy judges that DOMA’s bar to filing joint 
bankruptcy petitions by same-sex married couples violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and that this result is reached 
under rational basis or heightened scrutiny analysis). 
343.  699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (applying rational basis test to 
conclude that DOMA’s unequal treatment of same-sex married couples 
seeking federal employee benefits violated their Fifth Amendment equal 
protection rights). 
344.  698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (concluding that Congress’s 
enactment of DOMA was not a legitimate exercise of its Spending 
Clause authority because the legislation mandates that states treat 
same-sex and opposite-sex married couples differently in violation of 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees and that DOMA 
violates the Tenth Amendment by impermissibly interfering with states’ 
rights to regulate marriage). 
345.  682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding DOMA unconstitutional under a 
rational basis standard), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013). 
346. Judge Boudin wrote the opinion for the unanimous panel. 
347. George H.W. Bush appointed Judge Boudin first to the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia and then to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit. 
348. Gerald Ford appointed Judge Torruella to the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Puerto Rico.  
349.  Ronald Reagan appointed Judge Torruella to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit. 
350.  833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying rational basis test to 
conclude that DOMA’s bar to treating same-sex couples as married for 
estate tax purposes violated the taxpayers’ Fifth Amendment equal 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence  
924 
Windsor v. United States351 
(on appeal at the Second 
Circuit) 
Dennis G. Jacobs352 George H.W. Bush  
Christopher F. 
Droney  
William J. Clinton353 
and Barack H. Obama354 
Chester J. Straub355  William J. Clinton 
Table 2: The judge and appointing president of lower court 
decisions declaring DOMA unconstitutional before the Supreme 
Court made that determination. 
In addition to serving as exemplary models of judicial 
independence by applying law to fact despite multiple external forces 
denouncing extension of any rights—and especially marriage rights—
to gay men and lesbians, these federal court decisions striking down 
DOMA could not have been predicted based upon the political views 
of the presidents who appointed the jurists rendering the decisions.356 
As illustrated in Table 2, the majority of judges ruling in favor of 
marriage equality were appointed by Republican presidents. In an 
interesting twist, the Second Circuit jurist who wrote the Windsor 
opinion striking down DOMA was appointed by a Republican, while 
the dissenting judge, who characterized DOMA as a legitimate 
exercise of Congressional authority, was appointed by a Democrat. 
As is true of the state court decisions explained previously, federal 
court decisions declaring DOMA unconstitutional do not result from 
improper “judicial activism” but rather exemplify judicial 
independence. In each case, the judges meticulously applied Supreme 
Court precedent to the largely undisputed facts presented. The First 
Circuit’s consolidated resolution of Gill v. Office of Personnel 
Management357 and Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and  
protection guarantees), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding 
DOMA unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny standard). 
351.  699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding DOMA unconstitutional under 
intermediate scrutiny standard), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013). 
352. Judge Jacobs wrote the majority opinion for the panel. 
353. Bill Clinton appointed Judge Droney to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Connecticut. 
354. Barack Obama appointed Judge Droney to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit. 
355. Judge Straub dissented. For more details of his dissent, see infra note 
438. Thus, he cannot be counted among the judges that found DOMA 
unconstitutional. 
356. As explained previously, the political affiliation of a judge—indicated by 
the appointing president—is a key component to the widely accepted 
attitudinal model of judicial decision making, a model antithetical to 
judicial independence. See discussion supra Part I. 
357. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass 2010). 
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Human Services358 typifies this judicial independence model of judicial 
decision making. 
In Gill, the district judge concluded that DOMA violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s equal protection rights of same-sex married 
individuals.359 In Massachusetts, the same judge ruled that DOMA 
runs afoul of both the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause 
due to its effects on marriage-equality states.360 The First Circuit 
reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment decisions de novo.361 At 
the outset of the opinion, the First Circuit admitted the challenging 
nature of its review: 
This case is difficult because it couples issues of equal protection 
and federalism with the need to assess the rationale for a 
congressional statute passed with minimal hearings and lacking 
in formal findings. In addition, Supreme Court precedent offers 
some help to each side, but the rationale in several cases is open 
to interpretation. We have done our best to discern the 
direction of these precedents, but only the Supreme Court can 
finally decide this unique case.362 
Rather than shying away from the challenges posed by this politically 
charged case, the First Circuit jurists worked methodically through 
the arguments supporting and undermining DOMA’s constitutionality 
and engaged in nuanced analyses of the applicable law and fact.  
The court’s premier obstacle was determining the potential 
preclusive effect of Baker v. Nelson.363 While acknowledging that the 
 
358. 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass 2010). 
359. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 380–83, 396–97 (finding Fifth Amendment equal 
protection violations in DOMA’s denial of health benefits associated 
with federal employment, Social Security benefits based on spouse’s 
earning record, spouse’s lump sum death benefits and widower’s income 
benefits, and joint tax return filings under the Internal Revenue Code).  
360. Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 245–53 (finding DOMA: (1) an 
illegitimate exercise of Congress’s Spending Clause authority because it 
forced the state to treat same-sex and opposite-sex married couples 
differently in situations including interment in federally-supported 
veterans’ cemeteries, distribution of state-administered Medicaid 
benefits, and Medicare taxes paid by the state for its employees without 
providing a rational basis for doing so; and (2) contrary to the Tenth 
Amendment’s state rights guarantees because it usurps states’ 
traditional power to regulate marriage). 
361. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 7 
(1st Cir. 2012) (consolidating and affirming the judgments of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Gill and 
Massachusetts). 
362. Id. at 7–8. 
363. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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Supreme Court’s recognition of “gay rights” in Romer and Lawrence 
were grounded on the U.S. Constitution, the First Circuit refused to 
declare Baker irrelevant.364 Because neither Romer nor Lawrence 
involved marriage equality, the court concluded that “Baker does not 
resolve our own case, but it does limit the arguments to ones that do 
not presume or rest on a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.”365 
Turning to the Gill plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment equal protection 
claims, the court was immediately tasked with identifying the 
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. The court concluded that 
plaintiffs could not successfully challenge DOMA under the 
traditional rational basis test due to the great deference that standard 
affords lawmakers.366 Noting the court’s duty to “accept as adequate 
any plausible factual basis”367 justifying unequal treatment of same-
sex couples under the challenged statute, the court concluded that 
“Congress could rationally have believed that DOMA would reduce 
costs, even if newer studies of the actual economic effects of DOMA 
suggest that it may in fact raise costs for the federal government.”368 
The court displayed similar restraint in rejecting plaintiffs’ 
argument that the intermediate level of scrutiny should apply. Citing 
First Circuit precedent resolving a constitutional challenge to the 
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, the court reported that it 
“has already declined to create a major new category of ‘suspect 
classification’ for statutes distinguishing based on sexual 
preference.”369 The court cited the Romer Court’s failure to adopt 
such a classification.370 The First Circuit concluded that restraint was 
required because “to create such a new suspect classification for same-
sex relationships would have far-reaching implications—in particular, 
by implying an overruling of Baker, which we are neither empowered 
to do nor willing to predict.”371  
The First Circuit’s rejection of standard rational basis and 
intermediate scrutiny to test DOMA’s constitutionality led the court 
to a third option: a line of Supreme Court cases calling for application 
of a variation on standard rational basis when the challenged 
legislation disfavored unpopular groups. The First Circuit observed:  
 
364. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8.  
365. Id. 
366. Id. at 9. 
367. Id. 
368. Id. 
369. Id. 
370. Id. 
371. Id. 
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Without relying on suspect classifications, Supreme Court equal 
protection decisions have both intensified scrutiny of purported 
justifications where minorities are subject to discrepant 
treatment and have limited the permissible justifications. 
And . . . in areas where state regulation has traditionally 
governed, the Court may require that the federal government 
interest in intervention be shown with special clarity.372 
The First Circuit further explained that the Supreme Court 
neither recognized a higher level of scrutiny nor applied traditional 
rational basis in such cases.373 Instead, the Court closely examined 
“the case-specific nature of the discrepant treatment, the burden 
imposed, and the infirmities of the justifications offered.”374  
Applying this analysis, the First Circuit found that the 
“meaningful economic benefits” denied same-sex married couples 
under DOMA similar to those withheld from unpopular groups by 
legislation the Supreme Court had ruled unconstitutional.375 
Accordingly, “the extreme deference accorded to ordinary economic 
legislation . . . would not be extended to DOMA by the Supreme 
Court; and without insisting on ‘compelling’ or ‘important’ 
justifications or ‘narrow tailoring,’ the Court would scrutinize with 
care the purported bases for the legislation.”376 Viewed through this 
lens, plaintiffs’ argument regarding DOMA’s usurpation of states’ 
traditional role in defining marriage remained relevant to—but not 
determinative of—DOMA’s constitutionality.377  
The First Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ claims that DOMA 
represented overreaching by Congress under the Spending Clause or 
Tenth Amendment. The determination of marital status for federal  
372. Id. at 10. The First Circuit also relied on U.S. Department of 
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), which found a federal law 
that declared households with unrelated individuals ineligible for food 
stamps to be unconstitutional, and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), which invalidated a local ordinance as 
applied to deny a home for persons with mental disabilities. 
Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10. 
373. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10. 
374. Id. 
375. Id. at 11. 
376. Id. 
377. Id. at 11–12. The First Circuit explained that “Supreme Court 
precedent relating to federalism-based challenges to federal laws 
reinforce the need for closer than usual scrutiny of DOMA’s justifications 
and diminish somewhat the deference ordinarily accorded.” Id. The First 
Circuit cited Supreme Court precedent from the nineteenth century 
establishing that matters of domestic relations belong “to the laws of the 
States and not to the laws of the United States.” Id. at 12 (citation 
omitted) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890)). 
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benefits programs presents a federal interest, the court reasoned, and 
DOMA is not analogous to Supreme Court precedent declaring laws 
unconstitutional because “Congress sought to commandeer state 
governments or otherwise directly dictate the internal operations of 
state government.”378 Although Congress was not dictating internal state 
operations under DOMA, the court analogized to Supreme Court 
decisions invoking Commerce Clause and other constitutional 
authorities to conclude that “Congress’ effort to put a thumb on the 
scales and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its own 
marriage laws does bear on how the justifications are assessed.”379  
Having found that “a closer examination of the justifications that 
would prevent DOMA from violating equal protection (and thus from 
exceeding federal authority) is uniquely reinforced by federalism 
concerns,”380 the First Circuit carefully reviewed the four justifications 
for DOMA found in the House Committee Report381 and two related 
arguments advanced by BLAG. The Report’s justifications mirrored 
those raised in the state constitutional challenges discussed 
previously: “(1) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional, 
heterosexual marriage; (2) defending traditional notions of morality; 
(3) protecting state sovereignty and democratic self-governance; and 
(4) preserving scarce government resources.”382 BLAG’s additional 
justifications for DOMA were the “support [of] child-rearing in the 
context of a stable marriage”383 and Congress’s intent to “freeze” the 
debate over same-sex marriage to provide time to “reflect.”384 The 
First Circuit found these rationales insufficient to justify DOMA’s 
disparate treatment of same-sex couples. 
The First Circuit rejected the defense of traditional marriage 
rationale because “DOMA does not increase benefits to opposite-sex 
couples—whose marriages may in any event be childless, unstable or 
both—or explain how denying benefits to same-sex couples will 
reinforce heterosexual marriage.”385 The court characterized this 
 
378. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 12. 
379. Id. at 12–13. 
380. Id. at 13. 
381. The First Circuit also found it curious that Congress would enact any 
statute with such tremendous ramifications for federal and state law 
after a single day of hearings during which “none of the testimony 
concerned DOMA’s effects on the numerous federal programs at issue,” 
and that the entire statute is only a few paragraphs long with no preface 
to explain its purpose. Id at 13.  
382. H.R. Rep No. 104-664, at 12 (1996). 
383. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 14.  
384. Id. at 15–16. 
385. Id. at 14. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence  
929 
rationale not merely as a “poor fit” that might otherwise suffice under 
rational basis analysis, but as evincing “a lack of any demonstrated 
connection between DOMA’s treatment of same-sex couples and its 
asserted goal of strengthening the bonds and benefits to society of 
heterosexual marriage.”386  
While acknowledging that “[m]oral judgments can hardly be 
avoided in legislation,”387 the court found “traditional notions of 
morality” insufficient to justify DOMA’s treatment of gay and lesbian 
couples because “Lawrence ruled that moral disapproval alone cannot 
justify legislation discriminating on this basis.”388  
The court recognized that DOMA’s usurping of the states’ power 
to regulate marriage “indeed is antithetical to” the goals of protecting 
state sovereignty and self-governance.389 The First Circuit readily 
conceded that members of Congress may have legitimately believed 
that DOMA would help preserve government resources, but observed 
that “where the distinction is drawn against a historically 
disadvantaged group and has no other basis, Supreme Court 
precedent marks this [economic argument] as a reason undermining 
rather than bolstering the distinction.”390  
The First Circuit found the government’s support-for-child-
rearing rationale similarly unpersuasive because “DOMA cannot 
preclude same-sex couples . . . from adopting children or prevent a 
woman partner from giving birth to a child to be raised by both 
partners.”391 Finally, the First Circuit deemed the “time to reflect” 
argument insufficient to justify DOMA because the statute contained 
no sunset provision and because “[t]he House Report’s own 
arguments—moral, prudential and fiscal—make clear that DOMA 
was not framed as a temporary measure.”392 
In wrangling with this challenging case, the First Circuit noted 
the federal judiciary’s disfavor for declaring legislation 
unconstitutional.393 The court acknowledged that its review of DOMA 
 
386. Id. at 15.  
387. Id.  
388. Id. at 14–15 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003)). 
389. Id. at 14. The court noted that this rationale for DOMA supported 
section 2 of the act, which empowers states to disregard marriages of 
same-sex couples from other states, but that section was not at issue in 
this case. Id. 
390. Id. at 14. 
391. Id.  
392. Id. at 15. 
393. Id. The Court stated that “[i]nvalidating a federal statute is an 
unwelcome responsibility for federal judges.” Id. 
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started with the presumption that Congress had acted in good faith.394 
“In reaching our judgment,” the court explained, “we do not rely 
upon the charge that DOMA’s hidden but dominant purpose was 
hostility to homosexuality.”395 To the contrary, the court hypothesized 
that many members of Congress supported DOMA to “preserve the 
heritage of marriage as traditionally defined over centuries of Western 
civilization,” a motivation distinct from “mere moral disapproval of an 
unpopular group” as condemned by Lawrence.396 Even so, application 
of the court’s “best understanding of governing precedent”397 to the 
facts required it to strike down the statute. The First Circuit 
concluded: 
For 150 years, this desire to maintain tradition would 
alone have been justification enough for almost any statute. 
This judicial deference has a distinguished lineage, including 
such figures as Justice Holmes, the second Justice Harlan, and 
Judges Learned Hand and Henry Friendly. But Supreme Court 
decisions in the last fifty years call for closer scrutiny of 
government action touching upon minority group interests and 
of federal action in areas of traditional state concern. 
. . . . 
. . . Under current Supreme Court authority, Congress’ denial of 
federal benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in 
Massachusetts has not been adequately supported by any 
permissible federal interest.398 
This explanation of the First Circuit’s resolution of Gill and 
Massachusetts does not mean that this court’s analysis represents the 
only legitimate manner in which an independent judiciary could 
declare DOMA unconstitutional. To the contrary, other courts that 
subjected DOMA to higher standards of scrutiny similarly engaged in 
painstaking application of law to fact. But the First Circuit’s acute 
deference to circuit and Supreme Court precedent, its refusal to break 
new paths in constitutional law, its careful application of law to the 
uncontested facts, its predisposition to upholding legislation, and its 
assumption of Congress’s good faith in enacting DOMA document 
that a court employing a conservative approach to constitutional 
analysis can—and should—find compelling grounds supporting  
394. Id.  
395. Id. at 16. 
396. Id. at 16 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
397. Id. at 15–16. 
398. Id. at 16.  
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marriage equality in the U.S. Constitution. In short, the First 
Circuit’s resolution of the constitutional issues in Gill and 
Massachusetts cannot be characterized as the work of an 
inappropriately “activist” court. For the reasons set forth below, the 
same conclusions can be drawn for the trial and circuit court decisions 
in Windsor, although the Supreme Court’s opinion gives pause. 
C. Windsor  
1. District Court 
Plaintiff Edith (“Edie”) Windsor and her spouse, Thea Spyer, 
were in a committed relationship for more than four-and-a-half 
decades.399 They registered as domestic partners in New York City 
when that option became available in 1993 and married in Canada in 
2007.400 Spyer died in 2009, and her estate passed to Windsor.401 New 
York recognized the Windsor–Spyer marriage, but DOMA precluded 
the federal government from doing so.402 Because of DOMA, Windsor 
failed to qualify for the unlimited marital deduction under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 2056(a) and paid $363,053 in federal estate taxes.403  
Windsor initiated a refund suit alleging that DOMA’s bar to her 
marital deduction claim violated her Fifth Amendment equal 
protection rights.404 She urged the court to apply strict scrutiny to 
DOMA, a test requiring the government to prove that DOMA is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling or legitimate government 
interest. Windsor alternatively argued that DOMA is unconstitutional 
even under the highly deferential rational basis test.405 The House of 
Representatives’ Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) 
intervened to defend DOMA after Attorney General Holder 
announced that the Department of Justice would no longer do so.406 
After rejecting BLAG’s arguments that Windsor lacked 
standing407 and that Baker precluded her lawsuit,408 the district court 
 
399. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
400. Id.  
401. Id. 
402. Id. 
403. Id.  
404. Id. 
405. Id. 
406. Id. 
407. The district court rejected BLAG’s argument that New York State did 
not recognize Windsor’s Canadian marriage at the time Spyer died in 
2009 in light of significant evidence that New York recognized such 
marriages as early as 2004 and that the governor issued a directive in 
2008 requiring recognition. Id. at 398–99. 
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rejected Windsor’s argument that DOMA should be reviewed under 
strict or intermediate scrutiny.409 The court observed that eleven other 
circuit courts had used rational basis when the challenged legislative 
classification was based on sexual orientation and that the Supreme 
Court had declined to adopt a higher level of scrutiny despite the 
opportunity presented by Romer.410 “In any event,” the court 
explained, “the constitutional question presented here may be 
disposed of under a rational basis review,” thereby negating the need 
to “decide today whether homosexuals are a suspect class.”411  
Based on the Supreme Court’s intensified rational basis review in 
Lawrence, Romer, and other cases involving legislation that targeted 
historically disfavored groups, and in light of DOMA’s intrusion into 
matters traditionally governed by state law, the Windsor trial court 
reviewed DOMA under the enhanced rational basis test the First 
Circuit employed in Gill and Massachusetts.412 Similar to the First 
Circuit’s analysis, the Windsor trial court’s careful examination of 
DOMA’s justifications articulated in the House Report and by BLAG 
yielded no sufficient grounds justifying the federal government’s 
nonrecognition of Windsor’s marriage to Spyer.413 On June 6, 2012, 
the trial court granted Windsor’s motion for summary judgment and 
ordered the federal government to refund her estate tax payment.414  
2. Second Circuit  
The Second Circuit’s de novo review affirmed Windsor’s victory 
in a 2–1 decision.415  
The majority affirmed the district court’s rulings that Windsor 
had standing416 and that Baker did not preclude federal courts from 
 
408. The district court relied on Supreme Court precedent limiting the 
preclusive effect of its summary affirmances “to the precise legal 
questions and facts presented in the jurisdictional statement.” Id. at 399 
(citations omitted). The court further explained that: (1) DOMA, unlike 
the Minnesota statute challenged in Baker, does not prohibit same-sex 
marriage; and (2) unlike the Baker plaintiffs, Windsor does not argue 
that marriage is a fundamental right. Id. Thus Baker had not 
“necessarily decided” Windsor’s Fifth Amendment equal protection 
challenge. Id. 
409. Id. at 401–02. 
410. Id. at 401 (citations omitted).  
411. Id. at 402. The court also noted that this conclusion honored the well-
settled principle of avoiding constitutional issues superfluous to the 
result. Id. at 402 n.2. 
412. Id. at 402. 
413. Id. at 402–06. 
414. Id. at 406. 
415. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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addressing Windsor’s Fifth Amendment equal protection claims.417 
Unlike the district court below and the First Circuit’s recent 
resolution of Gill and Massachusetts, the Second Circuit in Windsor 
rejected application of enhanced rational basis review, finding that the 
origin of that standard in concurring and dissenting Supreme Court 
opinions attests to “some doctrinal instability in this area.”418 In any 
event, the Second Circuit explained that “no permutation of rational 
basis review is needed if heightened scrutiny is available, as it is in 
this case.”419 
Based on extensive guidance from numerous Supreme Court 
opinions, the Second Circuit identified these factors as determinative 
of heightened scrutiny’s applicability to Windsor’s equal protection 
arguments:  
A) whether the class has been historically “subjected to 
discrimination,” B) whether the class has a defining 
characteristic that “frequently bears [a] relation to ability to 
perform or contribute to society,” C) whether the class exhibits 
“obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that 
 
416. The Second Circuit declined BLAG’s request to certify to New York’s 
highest court the issue of whether New York recognized Windsor’s 2007 
Canadian marriage to Spyer at the time of Spyer’s death in 2009, even 
though New York did not allow same-sex couples to marry in that state 
until 2011. Id. at 177–78. Because the Second Circuit found the 
decisions of New York’s intermediate appellate courts “useful and 
unanimous on this issue,” the court found “no need to seek guidance 
here.” Id. at 177–78. 
417. The court distinguished the constitutional issue in Baker of whether 
states could restrict marriage to opposite sex couples from Windsor’s 
challenge to the federal government’s power to do so, and also noted 
significant changes in Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence since 
Baker, including recognition of intermediate scrutiny and cases like 
Romer and Lawrence legitimizing federal constitutional claims by gay 
and lesbian litigants. Id. at 178–79; see also id. at 178 n.1 (collecting 
cases with same conclusion).  
418. Id. at 181.  
419. Id. Similar conclusions were reached in Pedersen v. Office of Personnel 
Management, 881 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2012) (finding strict 
scrutiny appropriate but determining inequality resulting from DOMA 
could not survive even rational basis standard), Golinski v. U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(finding DOMA unconstitutional under either strict scrutiny or rational 
basis), Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to state statute denying marriage to gay and 
lesbian couples), and Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 
A.2d 407, 412, 480 (Conn. 2008) (applying intermediate scrutiny in state 
constitutional law challenge to statute’s denial of marriage based on 
sexual orientation).  
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define them as a discrete group[,]” and D) whether the class is 
“a minority or politically powerless.”420 
The court further clarified that immutability and political 
powerlessness are relevant but “not strictly necessary factors to 
identify a suspect class.”421 The Second Circuit encountered little 
difficulty in finding all these factors present in Windsor.  
BLAG’s concession that homosexuals have been subjected to 
discrimination in the United States since at least the 1920s led the 
court to conclude that “[n]inety years of discrimination is entirely 
sufficient to document a ‘history of discrimination.’”422  
Classification based on sexual orientation is not grounded in an 
“ability to perform or contribute,” the court determined, because 
“[t]he aversion homosexuals experience has nothing to do with 
aptitude or performance.”423  
The requirement that the class members exhibit “obvious, 
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics” cannot be limited to 
immutability, the court reasoned, because “[c]lassifications based on 
alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin are all subject to heightened 
scrutiny, . . . even though these characteristics do not declare 
themselves, and often may be disclosed or suppressed as a matter of 
preference.”424 Rather, the determinative factor “is whether the 
characteristic of the class calls down discrimination when it is 
manifest.”425 The court also rejected BLAG’s argument that sexual 
orientation is too amorphous to constitute a discrete class because the 
class affected by DOMA “is composed entirely of persons of the same 
sex who have married each other . . . [and] as counsel for BLAG 
conceded at argument, there is nothing amorphous, capricious, or 
tentative about their sexual orientation.”426  
 
420. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 181 (citations omitted). 
421. Id. 
422. Id. at 182. 
423. Id. at 182–83. The court also rejected BLAG’s argument “that same-sex 
couples have a diminished ability to discharge family roles in 
procreation and the raising of children” for lack of precedent, further 
explaining that “the abilities or inabilities cited by BLAG bear upon 
whether the law withstands scrutiny (the second step of analysis) rather 
than upon the level of scrutiny to apply.” Id. at 183 (citation omitted). 
424. Id. (citation and footnote omitted). The court further observed that 
even though protected by the Supreme Court under intermediate 
scrutiny, classes defined by “[a]lienage and illegitimacy are actually 
subject to change.” Id. at 183 n.4. 
425. Id. at 183. 
426. Id. at 184.  
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In addressing the final factor, the court explained that the key 
issue “is not whether homosexuals have achieved political successes 
over the years” but rather “whether they have the strength to 
politically protect themselves from wrongful discrimination.”427 
Comparing the contemporary political status of homosexuals with the 
political status of women in 1973 when the Supreme Court declared 
intermediate scrutiny appropriate for gender-based classifications,428 
the Second Circuit concluded that gay men and lesbians are still 
unable “to adequately protect themselves from the discriminatory 
wishes of the majoritarian public.”429 
This multifactor analysis led the Second Circuit to select 
intermediate scrutiny as its gauge for assessing DOMA’s 
constitutionality.430 Accordingly, BLAG bore the burden of 
demonstrating how DOMA’s sexual orientation classifications are 
“substantially related to an important government interest.”431 The 
Second Circuit emphasized that the justifications must be both 
“exceedingly persuasive”432 and “genuine, not hypothesized or 
invented post hoc in response to litigation.”433 BLAG’s arguments that 
DOMA furthered the important governmental interests of providing a 
uniform definition of marriage,434 protecting financial resources,435 
avoiding the “unknown consequences” of redefining “a foundational 
social institution,”436 and encouraging “responsible procreation”437 did 
not satisfy the Second Circuit.438  
 
427. Id.  
428. Id. at 184–85. 
429. Id. at 185. 
430. Id.  
431. Id. (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)). 
432. Id. (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) 
(citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). 
433. Id. 
434. Id. at 185–86. The Second Circuit found the consistency argument 
unpersuasive because DOMA represented an unprecedented intrusion by 
the federal government into an area of law uniquely reserved to the 
states and because DOMA “left standing all other inconsistencies in the 
laws of the states, such as minimum age, consanguinity, divorce, and 
paternity.” Id. at 186. 
435. Id. at 186–87. While recognizing that financial management is an 
important government interest, the Second Circuit recognized that cost 
savings alone cannot justify discrimination and also observed that 
DOMA affects the application of more than 1,000 laws, many of which 
have nothing to do with government revenues. Id.  
436. Id. at 185. The Second Circuit noted that tradition alone was not 
deemed sufficient to uphold sodomy laws or bans on interracial 
marriage, adding that DOMA is a poor means to preserve traditional 
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In declaring DOMA unconstitutional, the Second Circuit resisted 
pressure from religious groups to uphold the law. The court 
concluded: 
Our straightforward legal analysis sidesteps the fair point 
that same-sex marriage is unknown to history and tradition. 
But law (federal or state) is not concerned with holy 
matrimony. Government deals with marriage as a civil status—
however fundamental—and New York has elected to extend 
that status to same-sex couples. A state may enforce and 
dissolve a couple’s marriage, but it cannot sanctify or bless it. 
For that, the pair must go next door.439 
The Second Circuit’s embrace of intermediate scrutiny to analyze 
sexual orientation discrimination is well supported by application of 
extant law defining that standard to the facts repeatedly established 
in Windsor and other marriage equality cases. Nonetheless, it is more 
challenging to characterize a case as an appropriate exercise of 
judicial authority when it takes a view distinct from the eleven other 
circuit courts that have addressed it. But novelty alone does not move 
the decision from an appropriate exercise of judicial independence to 
inappropriate activism. To the contrary, cases in which the courts 
have refused to act boldly have proven the most damaging to the 
credibility of constitutional jurisprudence by allowing the tyranny of 
the majority to trump the constitutional rights of unpopular 
minorities.440 In any event, the Second Circuit’s split with its sister 
 
marriage because states retain the power to allow same-sex couples to 
marry. Id. at 187. 
437. Id. at 187. The Second Circuit accepted BLAG’s characterization of 
promoting procreation as an important governmental interest but could 
not find even a rational connection between DOMA and that interest 
because DOMA created no additional incentives for opposite-sex couples 
to marry and raise children. Id. 
438. The dissenting judge disagreed with the majority on virtually every 
point, concluding that Baker barred Windsor’s arguments, that the 
standard rational basis test should be applied to determine DOMA’s 
constitutionality, and that numerous arguments advanced by BLAG 
satisfy that standard. Id. at 188–211 (Straub, J., dissenting). The 
dissent also expressed a strong preference for the American people, 
rather than the judiciary, to decide the issue of marriage by same-sex 
couples. Id. at 211.  
439. Id. at 188 (majority opinion). 
440. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding 
federal government’s exclusion order requiring relocation from the West 
Coast and internment of Japanese Americans during World War II 
despite strict scrutiny analysis required for race-based classifications); 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (rejecting equal protection and 
other Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state law providing “equal 
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circuits provided an additional compelling reason for Supreme Court 
review.  
3. Supreme Court  
The Supreme Court’s decision to hear Windsor raised the hopes 
and fears of advocates and opponents of marriage equality.441 In 
addition to resolving DOMA’s constitutionality, many observers 
anticipated that the Supreme Court would finally determine the 
appropriate level of scrutiny for equal protection challenges based on 
sexual orientation classifications. The Court’s 5–4 decision striking 
down DOMA represents a landmark victory for advocates of the 
rights of gay men and lesbians, but it did not clarify the appropriate 
standard of review.442  
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy immediately 
confronted two potentially dispositive issues: “whether the United 
States’ agreement with [the district court’s] legal position precludes 
further review [of DOMA’s constitutionality] and whether BLAG has 
standing to appeal the case.”443 The Court had instructed the parties 
to address these issues in its order granting certiorari444 and 
subsequently invited Harvard Law Professor Vicki Jackson to submit 
an amicus brief arguing against jurisdiction on both issues,445 which 
she did.446  
 
but separate accommodations for the white and colored races” on 
railroads, and holding race-based separation an appropriate exercise of 
states’ police powers when regulating public transportation, schools, and 
other areas of public accommodation). 
441. These hopes were reinforced by the Court’s acceptance of Hollingsworth 
v. Perry, a Fourteenth Amendment and fundamental right challenge to 
California’s state constitutional marriage ban. The trial court struck 
down the ban. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, although on grounds only applicable 
to California’s unique situation of having allowed same-sex marriages 
and then banning them. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). 
The Supreme Court decided Perry on the same day as Windsor, 
concluding that appellants lacked standing in their appeals to the Ninth 
Circuit and the Supreme Court. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013). Accordingly, the district court decision stands. Although its 
precedential value is limited, the district court litigation serves as a 
model for challenges to other states’ bans being litigated in federal 
courts. A more complete analysis of Perry is outside the scope of this 
article.  
442. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
443. Id. at 2684. 
444. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
445. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 814 (2012).  
446. Brief for Vicki C. Jackson as Court-Appointed Amica Curiae 
Addressing Jurisdiction, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
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Although the government aligned with Windsor’s legal position, 
the President’s directive to the Executive Branch to continue 
enforcing DOMA resulted in the government’s continued refusal to 
refund Windsor’s tax payment.447 The Court concluded that the 
government’s rebuff created a justiciable controversy between 
Windsor and the government.448 The Court further reasoned that the 
federal government did not achieve the same “prevailing party” status 
as Windsor due to the trial court’s ruling—albeit a ruling the 
government desired—that DOMA is unconstitutional.449 The Court 
upheld the government’s standing to appeal the trial court decision by 
emphasizing the distinction between two bedrock principles: “the 
jurisdictional requirements of Article III and the prudential limits on 
its exercise.”450 
As to the Article III case and controversy requirement, the Court 
identified the federal government’s injury-in-fact in the trial court’s 
order “to pay money that it would not disburse but for the court’s 
order.”451 As to prudential standing, the Court recognized that the 
government’s alignment with Windsor’s legal position raised concerns 
that the appeal might lack the “concrete adverseness which sharpens 
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for 
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”452 The Court found 
the potential jurisdictional bar overcome in this case due to “the 
Executive’s unusual position”453 and several other factors. 
First, the participation of BLAG and amici curiae assured that 
DOMA would be vigorously defended.454 Second, the Court considered 
 
(2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 443. Professor 
Jackson is the Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law at 
Harvard. 
447. Holder letter, supra note 337 (“Notwithstanding this determination, the 
President has informed me that Section 3 will continue to be enforced 
by the Executive Branch. To that end, the President has instructed 
Executive agencies to continue to comply with Section 3 of DOMA, 
consistent with the Executive's obligation to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed, unless and until Congress repeals Section 3 or the 
judicial branch renders a definitive verdict against the law's 
constitutionality. This course of action respects the actions of the prior 
Congress that enacted DOMA, and it recognizes the judiciary as the 
final arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.”). 
448. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2685. 
449. Id. 
450. Id. 
451. Id. at 2686. 
452. Id. at 2687 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
453. Id. 
454. Id. 
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the consequences of jurisdictional dismissal relevant to its exercise of 
prudential standing. “The district courts in 94 districts throughout 
the Nation would be without precedential guidance,” the Court wrote, 
“in cases involving the whole of DOMA’s sweep involving over 1,000 
federal statutes and a myriad of federal regulations.”455 The Court also 
observed that it could take years for a similar case to work its way 
through the courts, meaning that “the costs, uncertainties, and 
alleged harm and injuries likely would continue for a time measured 
in years before the issue is resolved.”456 
Turning to the merits, the Court recognized Congress’s power to 
regulate marriage for discrete federal purposes.457 It also recognized 
that the definition and regulation of marriage have historically “been 
treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate 
States.”458 As a result, “the Federal Government, through our history, 
has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic 
relations.”459 Marriage laws governing the age of consent and 
consanguinity may (and do) vary among the states,460 the Court 
observed, but no state marriage requirement may run afoul of the 
U.S. Constitution.461  
Turning to Congress’s most extensive legislation governing 
marriage, the Court found serious constitutional flaws in Congress’s 
motivations for passing DOMA and the statute’s excessively broad 
impact on the rights, privileges, and obligations of same-sex married 
couples and their children. Congress’s “interference with the equal 
dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the 
exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect 
of the federal statute,” the Court wrote.462 “It was its essence.”463 The 
Court cited the House Report’s multiple references to moral 
condemnation of homosexuality as evidence of Congress’s animus 
toward gay men and lesbians.464 DOMA’s control “over 1,000 statutes  
455. Id. at 2688. 
456. Id. The Court’s holding that the government had properly pursued its 
appeal negated the need to determine whether BLAG had standing to 
do so. Id. 
457. Id. at 2690 (“Yet it is further established that Congress, in enacting 
discrete statutes, can make determinations that bear on marital rights 
and privileges.”). 
458. Id. 
459. Id. at 2691. 
460. Id. at 2691–92. 
461. Id. at 2691 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
462. Id. at 2693. 
463. Id. 
464. Id. 
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and numerous federal regulations . . . pertaining to Social Security, 
housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ benefits” 
and other areas of the law,465 the Court opined, “writes inequality into 
the entire United States Code.”466 The Court concluded: 
[T]he principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are 
to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage. 
This requires the Court to hold, as it now does, that DOMA is 
unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person 
protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 
The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against 
denying to any person the equal protection of the laws . . . . 
While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government 
the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does, the 
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment 
makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and all 
the better understood and preserved.467  
DOMA is invalid, the Court reiterated, because “no legitimate 
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure 
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity.”468 
To no one’s surprise, the four dissenting justices took the majority 
to task at every turn.  
Chief Justice Roberts found no evidence that a “bare desire to 
harm” motivated Congress’s passage of DOMA469 and predicted that 
the majority’s reliance on federalism “will come into play on the other 
side of the board in future cases about the constitutionality of state 
marriage definitions.”470 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Roberts and Thomas, accused 
the majority of possessing an “exalted conception” of the Court’s role 
in deciding constitutional issues.471 He opined that the parties’ 
standing to appeal evaporated when “Windsor’s injury was cured by 
 
465. Id. at 2694. 
466. Id. 
467. Id. at 2695. 
468. Id. at 2696. 
469. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
470. Id. at 2697. 
471. Id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the judgment in her favor”472 and the federal government concurred in 
the district court’s decision.473  
Turning to the majority’s decision on the merits, Justice Scalia 
found the Court’s justifications “rootless and shifting”474 for initially 
appearing to be grounded in federalism and then turning to Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment principles.475 Justice Scalia reprimanded the 
majority for failing to address the “central question” of “whether, 
under the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man 
and a woman are reviewed for more than mere rationality.”476 
Although characterizing DOMA as violating Fifth Amendment 
liberty guarantees, Justice Scalia argued that “[t]he majority never 
utters the dread words ‘substantive due process,’ perhaps sensing the 
disrepute into which that doctrine has fallen, but that is what those 
statements mean.”477 Justice Alito’s dissent similarly challenged the 
majority’s reliance on the Fifth Amendment. Substantive due process 
only applies to fundamental rights deeply rooted in history and 
tradition, Justice Alito writes, while marriage equality was not 
recognized by any state until the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
Goodridge decision in 2003.478 Because “the Constitution simply does 
not speak to the issue of same-sex marriage,”479 and because the 
effects of same-sex marriage are unknown and potentially far 
reaching,480 Justice Alito opined that “[a]ny change on a question so 
fundamental should be made by the people through their elected 
officials” rather than by the courts.481 
Justice Scalia also characterized the majority’s opinion as a thinly 
disguised attempt to set the stage for reaching “the same conclusion 
 
472. Id. at 2699. 
473. Id. at 2700. In his separate dissent, Justice Alito agreed with Justice 
Scalia that the federal government lacked standing to appeal. Id. at 
2711–12 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito, however, opined that 
BLAG’s intervention at the trial level and continued involvement in the 
case satisfied the standing requirements at both the circuit court and 
the Supreme Court. Id. at 2712–14. Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice 
Alito’s standing analysis and conclusion. Id. at 2703–05 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
474. Id. at 2705. 
475. Id. at 2706. 
476. Id. 
477. Id. 
478. Id. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
479. Id. at 2716. 
480. Id. at 2715–16. 
481. Id. at 2716. 
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with regard to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status.”482 
After identifying several passages from the majority’s Fifth 
Amendment analysis that Justice Scalia views as “deliberately 
transposable” to future Fourteenth Amendment marriage equality 
cases challenging state marriage bans,483 Justice Scalia predicted that 
“[a]s far as this Court is concerned, no one should be fooled; it is just 
a matter of listening and waiting for the other shoe.”484  
The dissenting justices’ sharp critiques of the majority’s opinion 
undermine the possibility that Windsor will be commonly cited as 
exemplary of judicial independence.485 At times the majority opinion 
tends to meander, thus lending support to the characterization of the 
decision as a result in search of a rationale. As Justice Scalia observes, 
the opinion appears initially to be grounding itself in well-established 
federalism principles before making a rather abrupt turn to Fifth 
Amendment liberty interests. And while marriage equality litigants 
have long argued that marriage is a fundamental right to which same-
sex couples are entitled, the Court sidesteps this long-standing and 
potentially dispositive issue by grounding its holding in a more 
amorphous Fifth Amendment liberty interest.  
The validity of the Windsor Court’s reliance on Fifth Amendment 
due process will be scrutinized in exceedingly fine detail by multitudes 
of constitutional scholars for decades to come. As proven by Loving v. 
Virginia,486 Brown v. Board of Education,487 and other opinions the 
Court has issued on highly charged sociopolitical issues, the legitimacy 
of the Windsor decision will be finally determined through a historical 
rather than contemporary lens.  
Analyzing the degree of judicial independence exercised by the 
Windsor majority requires identification of the decision-making model 
employed in this case. The Windsor Court’s failure to either: (1) 
employ standard equal protection analysis488 to resolve Windsor’s 
claim, or (2) articulate a reason for rejecting that analysis provides 
important clues in this endeavor.   
482. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
483. Id. at 2709–10. 
484. Id. at 2710. 
485. A more comprehensive evaluation of Windsor’s standing analysis 
requires a detailed comparison to the Court’s opposite conclusion in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), which, as previously 
noted, is outside the scope of this article.  
486. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
487. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
488. In this context, “standard equal protection grounds” means the Court’s 
application of the appropriate level of scrutiny (rational basis, enhanced 
rational basis, intermediate, or strict) to the justifications proffered by 
the government for the challenged law. 
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These omissions are especially curious due to myriad factors 
supporting application of a standard equal protection analysis to 
Windsor’s claim. The plaintiff’s complaint challenged DOMA on equal 
protection grounds. The Second Circuit decision under review not 
only relied on an equal protection analysis, but also broke ranks with 
other circuits489—and the Court’s Romer decision—by declaring 
intermediate scrutiny applicable to legislative classifications based on 
sexual orientation. Windsor’s affirmance of the Second Circuit 
decision, albeit on other grounds, arguably leaves intermediate 
scrutiny intact in non-marriage sexual orientation equality claims 
brought in the Second Circuit.  
In addition, the primary question debated by the parties and 
many amici who submitted briefs to the Supreme Court was the 
proper level of scrutiny to be applied to Windsor’s equal protection 
analysis.490 And the Court clearly recognized DOMA’s creation of two 
distinct classes: opposite-sex couples whose marriages were honored 
by the federal government and same-sex couples whose marriages 
were not.491 What then can explain the Court’s failure to apply—and, 
if necessary, to clarify—extant equal protection principles instead of 
charting a new course through Fifth Amendment jurisprudence?  
In short, Windsor is a very curious opinion both for what it does 
and does not hold. 
Only the justices who constitute the Windsor majority truly know 
what informed their individual and collective decisions to rely on 
Fifth Amendment substantive due process informed by equal 
protection and federalism principles rather than classic equal 
protection or fundamental right (to marry) analyses. Constitutional 
law is exceedingly complex, and, despite the continuing protests of 
Justice Scalia and other conservatives, it is of necessity an evolving 
body of law. Prior to Windsor, the Court had firmly established that 
the Fifth Amendment liberty interest “extends to the full range of 
conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be 
 
489. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(applying the rational basis test), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(applying the intermediate scrutiny standard). 
490. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(commenting that “[t]he opinion does not resolve and indeed does not 
even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: 
whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage 
to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than mere rationality”). 
491. Id. at 2694 (majority opinion) (criticizing DOMA for “creating two 
contradictory marriage regimes” that place “same-sex couples in an 
unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage”). 
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restricted except for a proper governmental objective.”492 Each justice 
may firmly believe that the Fifth Amendment analysis they employed 
to strike down DOMA represents no more than a nuanced application 
of well-established law to fact, an exercise well within the bounds of 
judicial independence.  
Another plausible explanation is that pragmatic considerations 
influenced the justices’ resolution of Windsor’s appeal. The Windsor 
Court strayed outside the realm of true judicial independence if the 
justices’ pragmatic concerns about the impact of its decision493 
motivated the justices’ rejection of equal protection or fundamental 
right analyses in favor of Fifth Amendment substantive due process.  
Evidence that Windsor reflects pragmatic judicial decision 
making494 is first found in the Court’s analysis of the jurisdictional 
issue created by the government’s alignment with the plaintiff at the 
trial level. In concluding that both Article III and prudential standing 
are satisfied, the Court emphasized the consequences of this appeal’s 
dismissal. The Court explained: 
The district courts in 94 districts throughout the Nation would 
be without precedential guidance . . . in cases involving the 
whole of DOMA’s sweep involving over 1,000 federal statutes 
and a myriad of federal regulations . . . . Rights and privileges 
of hundreds of thousands of persons would be adversely affected.  
. . .  
. . . [A]t some point a case likely would arise without the 
prudential concerns raised here; but the costs, uncertainties, and 
alleged harm and injuries likely would continue for a time 
measured in years before the issue is resolved. In these unusual 
and urgent circumstances, the very term “prudential” counsels 
that it is a proper exercise of the Court’s responsibility to take 
jurisdiction. For these reasons, the prudential and Article III 
requirements are met here.495 
Attaching a pragmatic label to the majority’s decision making in 
Windsor is further bolstered by considering the huge impact of the 
 
492. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (finding the District of 
Columbia’s racially segregated school system contrary to Fifth 
Amendment’s liberty guarantee).  
493. For the argument that pragmatic concerns influence every judicial 
decision, including Windsor, see Scherer, supra note 57. 
494. More precisely, the judicial decision-making model employed by the 
Windsor Court is most likely restrained pragmatism, as the Court’s 
decision reflects both concern for the parties before it and the impact of 
the decision. See discussion supra Part II.A.  
495. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688. 
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decision on states if DOMA had been declared unconstitutional on 
equal protection grounds. Regardless of whether the Court had 
employed Romer’s enhanced rational basis test used by most federal 
courts or the intermediate scrutiny employed by the Second Circuit, 
the Court’s Fifth Amendment equal protection analysis striking down 
DOMA likely would be imported immediately to Fourteenth 
Amendment challenges to state constitutional and statutory 
prohibitions of marriage by same-sex couples.  
Immediate application of Windsor to Fourteenth Amendment 
cases would be justified under the indissoluble link between Fifth and 
Fourteen Amendment jurisprudence. This link was created and 
endures because the Fifth Amendment contains no explicit guarantee 
of “equal protection.” Rather, six decades ago the Supreme Court 
held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates sub 
silento an equal protection component.496 This reverse incorporation of 
Fourteen Amendment equal protection into Fifth Amendment due 
process eternally joins Court opinions interpreting the two.  
Hence, if the Windsor Court had engaged in an equal protection 
analysis to strike down a federal marriage law under the Fifth 
Amendment, lower federal courts would employ the same analysis to 
resolve pending and future Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
challenges to state marriage laws. And, because states defend their 
respective marriage bans on the same grounds advanced by BLAG in 
Windsor such as tradition, morality, child rearing, and conservation of 
resources, a Windsor rejection of such justifications would likely doom 
the states’ defenses as well. In other words, a Windsor decision 
invalidating DOMA on equal protection grounds simultaneously 
would have sounded the death knell for state constitutional and 
statutory bans on marriage by same-sex couples even though the 
challenge to state bans was not before the Court.497   
496. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (finding the District of Columbia’s racially 
segregated schools created under federal charter unconstitutional on 
Fifth Amendment grounds for the same reasons that segregated schools 
created under state charters failed equal protection analysis under the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the companion case of Brown v. Board of 
Education); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693, 2695 (citing to Bolling 
twice in the majority opinion, but not to invoke classic equal protection 
analysis of DOMA); Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 Colum. L. 
Rev. 975, 975, 982–90 (2004) (explaining Bolling and “the absence of 
successful race discrimination claims against the federal government”).  
497. As Justice Scalia predicted, Windsor may have this impact on state law 
despite the majority’s reliance on substantive due process rather than 
equal protection grounds. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). Another possibility is that courts will interpret the Court’s 
substantive due process holding as equivalent to its recognition of a 
fundamental right to marry, again providing grounds for invalidating 
state constitutional and statutory bans. See Douglas NeJaime, 
Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 Yale L.J. Online 219 (2013). 
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Of course, the Court is no stranger to invaliding state laws. 
Lawrence struck down not only the Texas sodomy law at issue but 
also simultaneously invalidated similar laws in twelve other states.498 
The Loving Court doomed bans on interracial marriage in Virginia 
and fifteen other states.499 But a Supreme Court decision requiring 
states to recognize same-sex marriages would have invalidated thirty-
two state statutes500 and twenty-nine state constitutional 
amendments,501 many of which were enacted with overwhelming voter 
support.502 The Windsor majority may have perceived such a bold 
move as a bridge too far. Thus, pragmatism may have inspired the 
Windsor Court’s restraint, even if the five justices in the majority 
believe that not only DOMA but also state constitutional bans violate 
federal constitutional guarantees.  
Conclusion  
Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor described 
the Court’s 1954 earthshaking school desegregation decision in Brown 
 
498. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (observing that “[t]he 25 
States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the 
Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws 
only against homosexual conduct”). 
499. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967) (stating that “Virginia is now 
one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of 
racial classifications”). 
500. The majority of statutory same-sex marriage bans were passed around 
the same time as DOMA’s 1996 enactment. See Marriage & 
Relationship Recognition Laws, Movement Advance Project, 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/marriage_relationship_laws 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (providing information on the history and 
status of each state’s laws on marriage equality); see also Gay Marriage, 
ProCon.org, http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php? 
resourceID=004857 (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Gay 
Marriage]. 
501. Gay Marriage, supra note 500 (providing the date of each state’s 
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage). 
502. The largest movement toward marriage inequality was the eighty-six 
percent approval by Mississippi voters in 2004, and the smallest margin 
was the four percent of voters who carried California’s 2008 ban. The 
national average was sixty-seven percent voter approval for same-sex 
marriage bans prior to the most recent exercise in direct democracy: the 
May 2012 North Carolina ban approved by sixty-one percent of voters. 
See History of State Constitutional Marriage Bans: How North 
Carolina’s Amendment 1 Fits in the Larger Picture, Human Rights 
Campaign, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/state-constitutional-ma
rriage-bans (last visited Jan. 31, 2014); see also Gay Marriage, supra 
note 500. 
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v. Board of Education503 as “an exercise of accountability to the Rule 
of Law over the popular will.”504 As explained throughout this article, 
state and federal court decisions extending marriage equality, 
relationship recognition, and other rights and privileges to lesbian and 
gay individuals and couples should similarly be characterized as 
appropriate exercises of judicial independence, not inappropriate 
judicial activism. Simply put, many judges have rejected reliance on 
their own biases and preconceived notions about LGBT litigants in 
favor of applying the law to the credible and often undisputed 
evidence before them. Windsor’s apparent embrace of the pragmatic 
judicial decision-making model to rectify marriage inequality at the 
federal level while leaving inequity firmly ensconced in the vast 
majority of states serves as an important reminder, however, that the 
degree of judicial independence necessary to achieve full LGBT 
equality has yet to be realized.505 
 
 
503. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
504. Sandra Day O’Connor, Judicial Accountability Must Safeguard, Not 
Threaten, Judicial Independence: An Introduction, 86 Denv. U. L. 
Rev. 1, 3 (2008). 
505. Updates on the multitude of marriage equality cases currently pending 
in state and federal courts are available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/ 
pending-marriage-equality-cases. 
 
